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Copyright and Free Expression in
China’s Film Industry
By Eric Priest*
This Article analyzes whether copyright, which creates private rights
in original expression and is therefore a legal tool for restricting the dissemination of information, exacerbates or undercuts state censorship in
China’s film industry. Recent scholarship suggests that copyright law
reinforces China’s oppressive censorship regime because both copyright
and state censorship erect legal barriers around expressive works. The
theory that copyright enhances censorship in China, however, overlooks
the immense tension between state attempts at information control and
market-supported information production made possible by copyright.
This Article demonstrates that the Chinese government does not wield
unchecked, top-down control over China’s film industry because censorship policy and practice are profoundly influenced by complex interlocking power relationships between the audience, producers, and censoring
authorities. These relationships result in a constant dialog between these
groups that leads to concessions on all sides. Market-backed private producers meaningfully influence censorship policy because they are key
players in this power dynamic with sufficient leverage to counter the censors’ formidable heft. Drawing from political science literature on Chinese economic reform, this Article provides a theoretical basis for arguing
that selective enforcement of censorship rules, combined with (or indeed
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driven by) market forces and economic realities, can lead to meaningful
(albeit not absolute) liberalization and reform of the formal rules. The
transformative power of copyright and commercialization is limited: it is
not a panacea that will fully defang or obliterate censorship policies or
trigger democratic reform. Nevertheless, market demands and filmmakers’ need to satisfy those demands provide a counterbalance to state censorship that can, does, and will continue to erode censorship practices
and increase expressive diversity in Chinese media.
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INTRODUCTION
Does copyright amplify or undermine state censorship in China’s film industry? The question has global salience today: as China’s importance in the global film market increases—it is already
the world’s second largest box office1—foreign producers seek
more opportunities for preferential market access, resulting in foreign films and Chinese co-productions consciously targeting the
Chinese market.2 Pervasive censorship and creative interference by
authorities, however, means no producer, whether a powerful Hollywood studio or a major domestic producer, enjoys complete creative control over a release in the Chinese market. Some observers
rightly worry that in the film context, this will make China the tail
that wags the global free-speech dog.3 The fear is that as producers—both Chinese and international—increasingly and consciously
avoid sensitive subject matter that may offend Chinese censors,
China’s domestic censorship regime will become the global de facto censorship regime.
An important nuance that this narrative misses, however, is
that the influence works both ways. Films routinely violate numerous censorship rules—including regulations that ban the depiction
1

See Eric Priest, Copyright Extremophiles: Do Creative Industries Thrive or Just Survive
in China’s High-Piracy Environment?, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467, 484 (2014).
2
See, e.g., Frederik Balfour & Ronald Grover, China and Hollywood Team Up for More
Co-Productions, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
bw/magazine/china-and-hollywood-team-up-for-more-coproductions-09082011.html
[http://perma.cc/R9HX-AEV5].
3
See, e.g., Cain Nunns, Hollywood Bows to China Soft Power, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 16,
2012),
http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/hollywood-bows-to-china-soft-power/
[http://perma.cc/83BT-6TFS].
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of graphic violence, sexuality, criminal activity, and even time travel—but still manage to pass censorship review and be eligible for
wide theatrical release.4 Such films expose Chinese audiences to a
much wider array of concepts, themes, characters, and visuals than
the narrow, paternalistic socialist fare envisioned by state regulations.5 Although the reasons behind the enforcement of censorship
rules are complex and often opaque, the market for creative works,
supported and enabled by copyright, is a significant factor in authorities’ frequent decision to turn a blind eye to film producers’
use of officially verboten speech.6
It might seem self-evident that market-driven content industries, underwritten and enabled by copyright, push the boundaries
of officially permissible speech so long as audience tastes demand
it. After all, if this were not the case, the Chinese government
would continue to produce educational and propaganda films with
little regard for audience preferences or market trends, as it did in
the 1950s and 1960s.7 One glance at a list of China’s current sanctioned theatrical offerings, however, will assure any skeptic that
Chinese authorities care about audience tastes, about the marketability of works, and about the financial well-being of private domestic film producers.8 While pirated and “underground” films have
long been available, Chinese consumers now have access to “aboveground” content representing more diverse subject matter, genres, and styles than ever before in China’s history.9
Nevertheless, critics argue that copyright, as a legal tool for restricting the dissemination of information, may reinforce rather
than undermine censorship. Professor Peter Yu, for example, cautions that strong copyright protection and free speech may
represent “conflicting policy goals.”10

4

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.2.
6
See infra Part III.B.2.
7
See infra Part II.C.
8
See infra Part II.C.
9
See infra Part II.C.
10
See Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China
Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 431 (2008).
5
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From the standpoint of information control, . . .
stronger copyright protection may help control the
flow of information. From restrictions on the distribution of copyrighted materials developed by Chinese authorities to the ban on domestic distribution
of sensitive materials that have been developed and
copyrighted by foreign authors, copyright protection
is likely to help legitimize China’s information control policy.11
Likewise, Stephen McIntyre argues that “[n]ot only does the
substance of Chinese copyright law support China’s censorship
system, but as [enforcement campaigns] illustrate[], copyright enforcement overlaps with and furthers the regime’s efforts to control the content and exchange of ideas.”12 Professor Jinying Li
maintains that commercialized media and state censorship work in
concert to marginalize alternative, outside-the-mainstream voices
and viewpoints.13 Recent antipiracy campaigns, Li argues, are “part
of China’s growing effort to suppress, regulate, or at least normalize the otherwise uncontrollable underground domain . . . . More
importantly, this push to suppress piracy coincided with an uptick
in the Chinese government’s efforts to tighten its control over information circulation . . . .”14 Because many unapproved films are
only available in China via piracy (since they cannot be legally distributed), Li argues that effective copyright enforcement would deprive underground Chinese filmmakers of key creative resources—
unapproved films—from which to draw for their own creations.15
China’s deficient copyright enforcement, however, has enabled a
generation of underground filmmakers, weaned on pirated content,
to foster “a vibrant cineaste culture creating cinematic forms and
practices that present an alternative to the hegemony of commercial film industries and state censorship.”16
11

Id. at 429.
Stephen McIntyre, The Yang Obeys, but the Yin Ignores: Copyright Law and Speech
Suppression in the People’s Republic of China, 29 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 75, 79 (2011).
13
Jinying Li, From D-Buffs to the D-Generation: Piracy, Cinema, and an Alternative
Public Sphere in Urban China, 6 INT’L J. COMM. 542, 543, 560 (2012).
14
Id. at 542.
15
Id. at 552–55.
16
Id. at 543.
12
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Professor Li’s critique raises an important question: under a
strict state information control regime, is “approved” content inevitably complicit in censorship? Can approved content simultaneously be oppositional, or at least have the ability to erode power
structures or bring fresh viewpoints on important, even sensitive
topics? This Article argues, after examining the relationship between censors and commercial content producers in China’s film
industry, that sanctioned commercial media can counter the power
of the sanctioning authority and can do so even more effectively
than unsanctioned “outsider” media. This is because Communist
Party (the “Party”) censorship authorities—at least since the end
of the Cultural Revolution in 1976—are not all-powerful in their
ability to control content. In reality, censorship policy and practice
are profoundly informed by complex interlocking power relationships—in particular between the audience, producers, and censoring authorities. These relationships result in a constant negotiation
between the groups. This leads to concessions of varying degrees
on all sides, with constant ebbs and flows as a result of changing
political, social, and economic dynamics. To have a meaningful impact on censorship policy, therefore, one must be a key player in
this power relationship with enough leverage to counter the censoring authorities’ formidable heft.
This Article focuses its discussion of censorship and copyright
in China’s film industry for two reasons. First, film is among the
three types of long-form cultural works most heavily censored by
Chinese authorities; the other two are books and television programs.17 Among these three industries, Chinese film has arguably
had the deepest interaction with global commerce. It therefore
provides a valuable case study for evaluating the effects of commercialization and copyright on censorship practices in China.
Second, Professor Hongsong Song is undertaking an analogous
study of copyright, commercialization, and censorship in the book
publishing industry.18 Professor Yu Zhao is doing valuable work on
17

Music is censored, but not as strictly as film, television, or books. See Priest, supra
note 1, at 505. News media, of course, are heavily censored. See generally DANIELA
STOCKMANN, MEDIA COMMERCIALIZATION AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN CHINA (2013).
18
Hongsong Song, Dancing in Shackles: Copyright in China’s Highly Regulated
Publishing Market, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 285, 296–308 (2013) [hereinafter Song,
Dancing in Shackles]; Hongsong Song, Development of Copyright Law and the Transition of
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censorship and commercialization in China’s television industry.19
To date, however, no one has closely analyzed the effect of copyright and commercialization on China’s film censorship policy.
To critique claims that copyright bolsters censorship in China,
this Article focuses its analysis on the market’s role in shaping China’s film industry and influencing censors. Admittedly, the market
and copyright are not coextensive. For example, China had a relatively thriving film market in the 1920s, before any copyright law
existed there.20 Likewise, although China had a copyright law on
the books by the 1930s,21 when it experienced its first “golden age”
of film production,22 the law was rarely enforced and therefore unlikely to have significantly contributed to the boom.23 Even today,
film revenue in China is substantial but, due to lax copyright enforcement, it derives largely from box office receipts rather than
sales of copies.24 Nevertheless, it is appropriate to view the market’s effects on state information control policy in China today as a
proxy for copyright’s effects, as the two are tightly intertwined.
Copyright has long been recognized in the West as a robust marketmaking mechanism for works of creative expression, supporting
non-state centers of information production.25 The copyright regime provides the property rights framework that orders China’s
sophisticated modern film market and distinguishes it from the socialist, state-funded film production system in place for four decades from the 1950s until the 1990s.26 Copyright provides the predictable allocation of rights necessary to secure the substantial private investment—often transnational in nature—that drives proPress Control in China, 16 OR. REV. INT’L L. 249 (2014) [hereinafter Song, Development of
Copyright Law].
19
Yu Zhao, Chinese Dream, Positive Energy, and TV Entertainment: The Tightrope
Walking of Chinese Provincial Satellite TV Channels (April 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
20
See infra Part II.A.
21
See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
22
See infra Part II.B.
23
See WILLIAM ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 52 (1995).
24
Priest, supra note 1, at 481 & n.70.
25
See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
289, 346–62 (1996).
26
See infra Part II.E.
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duction at the heart of China’s modern film market. Lastly, as China’s film market evolves and matures, business models directly
based on copyright licensing, such as on-demand Internet and settop box streaming, are an increasingly important revenue source
for film producers.27
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly highlights the
historical ties between copyright and censorship in AngloAmerican law and Chinese law. Part II describes the history of
China’s film market, with a particular emphasis on the interplay
between political and commercial trends and censorship. Part III
considers whether market-induced liberalizations of China’s film
censorship rules, discussed in Part II, have led to meaningful gains
over time for expressive freedom in China’s film market. It analyzes “freedom” along two dimensions: (1) plurality of voices and
viewpoints in films lawfully distributed in China, and (2) diversity
of approved film subject matter. Changes along these dimensions
can be observed through the extent to which market pressures lead
to formal liberalization of the rules, or to which sanctioned films
technically violate censorship rules. Part III proceeds by providing
a brief outline of pertinent censorship rules. It then analyzes how
market pressures have changed the rules or influenced how they
are applied in practice. It argues that the general trend is toward
greater, not less, freedom of expression in China’s film market,
even if unbridled free expression is not in China’s foreseeable future. It draws from political science literature on Chinese economic
reform to provide a theoretical basis for arguing that selective enforcement of rules, combined with (or indeed driven by) market
forces and economic realities, can lead to meaningful (albeit not
absolute) liberalization and reform of formal rules.
27

See Priest, supra note 1, at 486–88 (noting that major Chinese online licensing
platforms have purged their services of pirated content in recent years and paid copyright
owners hundreds of millions of dollars for exclusive licenses to stream films and television
content); see also Juro Osawa, Tencent to Distribute HBO Dramas, Movies Online in China,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tencent-partners-with-hboto-distribute-tv-dramas-movies-online-in-china-1416902891 [http://perma.cc/M9UUTRSM] (discussing Chinese Internet giant Tencent’s exclusive online licensing deal with
HBO, noting competitor Alibaba’s announced alliance with Lions Gate Entertainment to
offer programs on set-top boxes in China, and noting that Xiaomi, China’s largest
smartphone maker by shipments, announced plans to invest $1 billion in video content).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT AND CENSORSHIP IN
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
A. Copyright and Censorship in Anglo-American Law
Copyright and press control have long been linked.28 As a general matter, both copyright and state censorship erect legal barriers
around certain works of expression, making it unlawful to publish
them without proper privileges or permissions. Influential copyright historian L. Ray Patterson and others have argued that this is
more than coincidence: the precursor to modern Anglo-American
copyright was in fact born of the English monarchy’s early censorship efforts.29 Patterson points to Queen Mary’s grant of a charter
to the stationers’ guild in 1557 as the inception of copyright and a
simultaneous attempt at press control.30 The charter gave Stationers’ Company members the exclusive right to print and publish in
exchange, ostensibly, for the stationers’ compliance in suppressing
seditious works.31 Patterson argues that the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution, when drafting the Copyright Clause,32 were aware of
this history and wary of copyright’s censorship-like nature.33 They
therefore included the perambulatory phrase in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution “to promote the Progress of Science”
in part to establish that copyright is not to be used for censorship
because its constitutional goal is to promote learning.34 Nevertheless, the propensity persists for private actors to invoke copyright
as a tool to suppress criticism or other uses of which the author dis28

See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT
(Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 HOUS. L. REV. 215 (2009); see also HARRY RANSOM,
THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 29 (1956).
29
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Guttenberg’s Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and Religious
Pluralism, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326–27, 391 (2003); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the
Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 374 (2000); Pamela Samuelson,
Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319,
323–24 (2002); John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245, 294 (2015).
30
PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 28, at 245.
31
Id.; RANSOM, supra note 28, at 29.
32
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33
PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 28, at 376–77.
34
Id. (“The Tudors and Stuarts used copyright to protect the populace from heretical,
seditious, and schismatical material. The Framers (of the United States Constitution),
drawing upon that experience, incorporated those lessons into the Copyright Clause and
the First Amendment.”).
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approves.35 Examples include political candidates seeking to prevent a challenger’s use of their words,36 religious groups seeking to
stifle the dissemination of religious texts for the purpose of criticism,37 companies seeking to scour leaked documents from the
Web,38 and public figures such as L. Ron Hubbard and J.D. Salinger seeking to suppress the publication of unauthorized biographies.39
The ties between copyright and censorship in Anglo-American
jurisprudence can be overstated, however. For example, it is not
even clear as a historical matter that censorship was the motivating
factor behind the monarch’s grant of the Stationers’ charter.40 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has argued that as a bulwark
35

See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169 (2007); Stephen McIntyre, Private Rights and Public Wrongs: Fair
Use as a Remedy for Private Censorship, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 61 (2012).
36
See McIntyre, supra note 35, at 62–64 (describing a case in which one political
candidate threatened to use copyright law to prevent a challenger from using the
candidate’s own words in a political campaign).
37
See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
1290 (D. Utah 1999); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923
F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see generally Cotter, supra note 29.
38
See, e.g., Paul Resnikoff, Sony Forces The Verge to Remove Its Spotify Contract...,
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (May 21, 2015), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/
2015/05/21/breaking-spotify-forces-the-verge-to-remove-its-sony-contract
[http://perma.cc/S2NM-MYQE] (reporting that major record label Sony used a
“copyright claim” to force online technology news site The Verge to take down a leaked
contract between Sony Music and Internet music site Spotify).
39
See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990)
(biography of L. Ron Hubbard); New Era Publ’n Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1989) (biography of L. Ron Hubbard); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d
90 (2d Cir. 1987) (biography of J.D. Salinger).
40
Copyright historian Ronan Deazley, for example, concludes that numerous sources
and histories indicate that although the Tudor period was marred with press censorship,
it “remained an essentially ad hoc and reactive phenomenon” and “both Mary and
Elizabeth relied, not primarily upon the Company of Stationers, but on the use of
statutory instruments and royal proclamations to censure heretical and treasonous texts.”
Ronan Deazley, Commentary on the Stationers’ Royal Charter 1557, in PRIMARY SOURCES
ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008),
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/commentary/uk_1557/uk_1557_com_972007121
517.html [http://perma.cc/P25S-UUXQ]. Historian John Feather likewise maintains that
“[f]ar from being a ‘master-stroke of Elizabethan policy’ . . . the grant of the [Stationers’]
Charter was a perfectly regular transaction for the commercial benefit of the gild of
stationers which we may take to have been initiated by them.” JOHN FEATHER, A
HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 30 (2d ed. 2005).
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against exercises of copyright that unduly burden speech, U.S.
copyright law incorporates specific free-speech accommodations,
in particular the fair use doctrine and the idea-expression dichotomy.41 While these are often unwieldy in practice and hardly function perfectly to curb abusive uses of copyright,42 they are still powerful doctrines on which creators and courts routinely rely to
create space for the unauthorized reproduction, dissemination, and
transformation of protected works—especially for purposes of critiquing the author or her work.
Lastly, and most importantly, although copyright law grants exclusive rights that allow the author to limit the reproduction and
dissemination of original expression, the intended net effect is to
enhance rather than diminish free speech. Thus the U.S. Supreme
Court has dubbed copyright an “engine of free expression”43 because copyright “establish[es] a marketable right to use one’s expression,” thereby supplying “the economic incentive to create
and disseminate ideas.”44 This market-making function is often
viewed as the primary rationale for copyright in American jurisprudence.45 According to commentators such as David Ladd and
Neil Netanel, this function of copyright in fact does nothing less
than undergird democracy.46 Because copyright “supports a market-based sector of authors and publishers . . . who look to paying
audiences (and advertisers) for financial sustenance,” authors need
not look to government subsidies or elite or corporate patronage for
financial support.47 This promotes free discourse because authors
41

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). For a discussion of the tension between
copyright jurisprudence and the First Amendment, see Terry Hart, Artistic Expression, the
First Amendment, and Copyright, COPYHYPE (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.copyhype.com/
2010/09/artistic-expression-the-first-amendment-and-copyright/
[http://perma.cc/3HJC-TJGW].
42
For a discussion of cases in which copyright was used primarily as a tool to suppress
political or critical speech, see McIntyre, supra note 35.
43
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
44
Id.
45
See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 170 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
46
David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 421, 427–28 (1983); see also NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 91 (2008);
Netanel, supra note 25, at 341–64.
47
NETANEL, supra note 46, at 91.
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who are beholden to the government or elite or corporate patrons
for their livelihoods are far more likely to self-censor, particularly
with regard to speech that would undermine or offend the patron
or benefactor. According to Netanel, this holds true even in an era
of commercialized mass media for two reasons.48 First, copyright
still helps support many smaller, independent voices outside the
commercial mainstream that contribute to democratic discourse.49
Second, commercial mass media, for its many failings, possesses
the platform, resources, and heft to be a watchdog over powerbrokers, shape and frame public discourse, and be a trusted, accountable intermediary.50
B. Copyright and Censorship in China
The theory that copyright provides structural support to existing democracies prompts the more challenging question of whether
copyright can help affirmatively advance the cause of democracy in
non-democratic countries such as China. This echoes a wider body
of literature on the role that private property plays in advancing
democracy.51 While a review of that literature is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is worth noting the conclusions of property scholar Carol Rose.52 After surveying numerous examples of privatization initiatives around the globe and their democratizing effects (or
lack thereof), Rose concludes that the effect of privatization on
democratic reform is less inevitable or predictable than some theorize, but it is still an important factor: “The take-away lesson is that
privatization in a modern context is only one of a whole array of
political reforms, though it is an important one.”53 This rings true
in China, where herculean state-initiated privatization efforts over
the past three decades have failed (by design) to yield much demo-

48

Id. at 92–94.
Id. at 93.
50
Id. at 92–98.
51
For an introduction, see generally Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to
Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691 (2006). For an intellectual property-focused
comment on Professor Rose’s article, see Mark P. McKenna, Intellectual Property,
Privatization, and Democracy: A Response to Professor Rose, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 829 (2006).
52
See Rose, supra note 51, at 720.
53
Id.
49
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cratic reform.54 Even if it fails to yield fundamental democratic reforms, however, introducing private incentives to the media and
copyright industries distances them from the state, creating space
for more voices and viewpoints. As Rose observes, following broad
privatization efforts “[t]he Chinese press is not bold by Western
standards, but it still is bolder than it was a few years ago.”55 Neil
Netanel similarly argues that public exposure even to commercial
media “tends to erode passive acceptance of authoritarian power
relations” by “imparting an appreciation for innovation, enhancing
audience ability to imagine themselves outside prevailing roles, and
engendering a sense that individuals can act on their environment
to achieve their personal and political goals.”56
While copyright law is relatively new in China, censorship is
not.57 “[S]ubstantial, sustained efforts” to control publication and
dissemination of politically sensitive works date at least to the advent of the printing press during the Tang Dynasty (618–907
A.D.), and have only increased in their intensity and extensiveness
since.58 Today, potent and pervasive press and media control in
China is effected through a byzantine latticework of bureaucratic
agencies, formal policies and regulations, and informal pressure
tactics that breed self-censorship. China consistently ranks near the
bottom of Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index.59
Unsurprisingly, therefore, copyright—a form of private information control—sometimes appears bound up in state censorship
policy and enforcement actions. Despite having among the world’s
worst intellectual property enforcement records,60 China is home
54

See generally KELLEE S. TSAI, CAPITALISM WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: THE PRIVATE
SECTOR IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2007).
55
Rose, supra note 51, at 706–07.
56
Neil W. Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51
VAND. L. REV. 217, 260 (1998).
57
See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 9–29.
58
See id. at 13–17.
59
See Press Freedom Index 2013, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf.org/
press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html [http://perma.cc/N87Q-4ZNE] (last visited Oct.
11, 2015). In the 2013 index, for example, China ranked an ignominious 173rd out of 179
countries. Id.
60
See generally Eric Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 795, 801 (2006).
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to the highest volume of intellectual property enforcement in the
world, even when controlling for population.61 Much of that enforcement on the copyright side is in the form of official campaigns
that are notorious for producing grand enforcement spectacles, that
have little meaningful effect on piracy.62 At least one major copyright enforcement campaign arose out of a broader censorship
campaign aimed at eradicating pornographic materials.63 Stephen
McIntyre therefore expresses concern that copyright infringement
may provide Chinese authorities “with an opportunity—or, more
cynically, an excuse—to crack down on expression that it considers
threatening, such as political dissent, religious information, and
other so-called ‘unhealthy’ media.”64
Modern copyright in China has in fact been tied to censorship
from its inception. Mao Zedong understood well the power of media and cultural products and their ability to shape ideology. His
famous address on art and literature at Yan’An in 1942 and the
contemporaneous Rectification Campaign were designed to weed
out intellectual dissension and unify party thinking on the role of
art and culture.65 Mao warned that proletarian co-optation of culture was a profound threat to the revolutionary cause, and espoused party control over cultural production.66 In delineating art
and literature’s “proper” role in society, Mao invoked Lenin’s metaphor of art and literature as the “cogs and wheels” of the revolutionary machinery.67 He then deftly combined the Leninist view

61

See MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 33 (2011).
62
Id. at 221–26.
63
See McIntyre, supra note 12, at 79.
64
Id.
65
See Kirk A. Denton, Literature and Politics: Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum
on Art and Literature,” in THE COLUMBIA COMPANION TO MODERN EAST ASIAN
LITERATURE 463, 463–64 (Joshua S. Moscow ed., 2003).
66
Junhao Hong, Mao Zedong’s Cultural Theory and China’s Three Mass-Culture Debates:
A Tentative Study of Culture, Society, and Politics, 4 INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 87, 96
(1994).
67
See Denton, supra note 65, at 467; Alexander Des Forges, The Uses of Fiction: Liang
Qichao and His Contemporaries, in THE COLUMBIA COMPANION TO MODERN EAST ASIAN
LITERATURE, supra note 65, at 341, 341–45.
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with the view of traditional Confucian scholars that literature
should be morally edifying and politically subservient.68
Just as the Soviet model of information control blended well
with traditional views on Chinese literature, the Soviet approach to
intellectual property proved a better fit for the new People’s Republic (founded in 1949) than did the copyright system of the preceding Republican era.69 The nationalist government of the Republican era (1912–1949) viewed instituting intellectual property laws
as critical to the establishment of a modern legal system, and the
first intellectual property measure passed was the Copyright Law
of 1928.70 Highly influenced by German and Japanese copyright
statutes,71 the 1928 law granted economic and moral rights to authors for books, music, photographs, designs, sculpture, and other
technical, literary, and artistic works for a term of the author’s life
plus thirty years.72 The copyright law and related regulations contained overt censorship provisions prohibiting copyright registration and publication of works deemed to violate the Guomindang
“party spirit” or harm the “public order.”73 Nevertheless, the
1928 copyright law was at its core premised on, in Professor Alford’s words, “the existence of a marketplace of ideas.”74 Because
Mao viewed information as subservient to Party policy and Confucian tradition emphasized emulation of past forms over novelty,75
the notion of a marketplace of ideas was, in Professor Alford’s
view, “neither acceptable to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party nor previously witnessed in the Middle Kingdom.”76
68

Denton, supra note 65, at 467.
See ALFORD, supra note 23, at 56–57.
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Id. at 50.
71
Id.
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See Zhonghua Minguo Shiqi Nian Zhuzuo Quanfa (中华民国十七年著作权法)
[Copyright Law of the Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nationalist Gov’t, May
14, 1928), arts. 1, 4 (China), translated in Copyright Law of the Republic of China, CHINA
COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/1928/05/14/
copyright-law-of-the-republic-of-china/ [http://perma.cc/G3Z8-JRLH] (last visited Sept.
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In the early years of the People’s Republic, the Party ensured
substantive control of popular creative works by restricting their
production to work units under Party supervision.77 Following the
Soviet example, Party policy recognized an author’s right to basic
remuneration (usually based on the number of copies printed) and
the right to prevent unauthorized alteration of the work.78 The Party-state fixed compensation levels that had little relationship to the
market for the work.79 The outcome was, as intended, a centrally
planned system of cultural production that resulted in creative output consisting largely of thematically confined propaganda. As the
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) drew to a close, China emerged
from its isolationist shell to more deeply engage with the rest of the
world. It became clear to Party leadership that comprehensive topdown control of cultural production was unsustainable not only because the state could no longer bear the substantial costs but also
because the narrow works of propaganda failed to satisfy rapidly
diversifying consumer tastes in media and entertainment resulting
in part from increasing cross-border cultural exchange.80 In 1979, as
the combined result of these internal impetuses81 and exogenous
pressure from the United States, whose authors’ works received no
protection in China at that time,82 China embarked on the development of the first modern copyright law in the history of the
People’s Republic.83
The resulting copyright law, promulgated in 1990, was shaped
by nearly a decade of intense internal debate. Although some prominent Chinese officials favored the development of a Western-style
copyright law, support was far from unanimous.84 Still steeped in
77

See Song, Development of Copyright Law, supra note 18, at 251–54.
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socialism, politically orthodox officials questioned the wisdom of
granting private rights in information goods and the resulting effect
on state-owned media and the entire system of state press control.85 The debate about whether or not the copyright law should
include provisions to ensure copyrighted works were ideologically
“correct” only intensified following the 1989 Tiananmen protests.86 Ultimately, the law was drafted with an express censorship
provision: Article 4 denied copyright protection to works “the publication or distribution of which is prohibited by law” and required
that copyright owners, “in exercising their copyright, shall not violate the Constitution or laws or prejudice the public interests.”87
Even in China, however, the relationship between copyright
and censorship is often misunderstood or overstated. Some commentators see stronger copyright protections as complementing
and exacerbating state information controls by erecting even higher
and thicker barriers around information.88 Much evidence points in
the opposite direction, however. As a general matter, the Chinese
government certainly need not rely on copyright to strengthen information controls when it wants, and there is little evidence that
the government views copyright as a tool for enhancing censorship.
In fact, evidence suggests that at least some in the Chinese government have long been wary of copyright’s free-speech enhancing
capability. This wariness is reflected in the disagreement among
Chinese officials, during the drafting of the 1990 Copyright Law,
85

Id. at 251–57.
MERTHA, supra note 82, at 125.
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Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuo Quanfa (中华人民共和国著作权法)
[Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991), art. 4 (China) [hereinafter
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China], translated in Copyright Law of the
People’s Republic of China (Official Translation), CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/1990/09/07/copyright-law-of-thepeople’s-republic-of-china-official-translation/ [http://perma.cc/AEE8-ACLD] (last
visited Oct. 12, 2015). Article 4 became the bane of foreign copyright owners. Foreign
works imported into China for publication may not be disseminated lawfully until they
have passed censorship review. Accordingly, while works awaited censorship review
(which could take many months) they were ineligible for lawful distribution and,
therefore, unprotected by copyright. See Priest, supra note 1, at 489–90. This loophole
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over the desirability of granting private rights in information
goods.89 In another example, China’s National Copyright Administration (“NCA”) is situated within the primary censoring body for
literary works (the General Administration for Press and Publications (“GAPP”)), but Andrew Mertha suggests that in the past
GAPP may have intentionally underfunded and undermined the
NCA because of alleged concerns within GAPP about promoting
private authorial rights and free-market information production.90
Moreover, although Chinese copyright law was conceived as a
hybrid author rights and press control law in China, it has since
steadily progressed in favor of author rights and away from press
control.91 Professor Hongsong Song attributes this trend largely to
foreign pressure: continuous negotiations between the United
States and China throughout the 1990s, during which the United
States pushed China to lower its market barriers imposed by censorship policies, “can . . . be deemed to be not only a conflict between two countries, but also a form of struggle between state control and market forces.”92 Under foreign pressure, Chinese officials
amended several areas in which the copyright law had facilitated
press control, including a lack of performance rights in various
types of works, certain statutory licensing provisions, and broad
fair use provisions privileging certain state uses, all of which facilitated government use of copyrighted works for propaganda purposes.93 To comply with its treaty obligations, China initially
amended the provisions only with regard to foreign works, and
maintained a dual system that discriminated against Chinese
rightsholders for nearly a decade.94
Further engagement with the global economy and intellectual
property community drove an even deeper wedge between Chinese
copyright law and its press-control roots. After joining the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2001, China elevated domestic

89
90
91
92
93
94
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Id. at 298; see also Wu, supra note 82, at 21–22.
Song, Development of Copyright Law, supra note 18, at 299–304.
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rightsholders’ status to that of foreigners.95 Later, in 2007, the
United States lodged a host of copyright-related complaints against
China with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, aiming to dismantle censorship and market access controls that hampered U.S. copyright owners’ ability to compete with piracy and monetize the
Chinese market.96 Among its claims, the United States alleged that
article 4 of China’s Copyright Law contravened China’s obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) and the Berne Convention by conditioning copyright protection on the formality of passing censorship review, and by depriving unapproved works of required minimum
standards of protection.97 U.S. copyright owners complained that
article 4 afforded pirates a major legal safe harbor by arguably denying protection to all foreign works except those that had been submitted for, and successfully passed, censorship review.98 China responded that the Berne Convention expressly preserves members’
rights to censor works and prohibit their distribution.99 The WTO
panel found that article 4 denied copyright protection to works that
failed content review.100 Since the sovereign’s right to censor does
not include the right to deny copyright protection, article 4 conflicted with China’s obligation under TRIPS and Berne to afford
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substantive copyright rights.101 China subsequently amended the
copyright law to delete the language from article 4 that denied copyright protection to prohibited works.102 The practical benefit of
this amendment for foreign copyright owners seeking improved
copyright protection in China is doubtful,103 but the episode evidences how foreign pressure to strengthen copyright protection
checks the Chinese government’s ability to use copyright as a formal censorship tool.
In a parallel proceeding, the United States assailed the staterun film import and distribution duopoly that China’s information
control regime enables.104 Only one entity—the state-owned China
Film Import and Export Corporation—holds the required permit
to import films into China,105 while just two companies—China
Film and Huaxia Film Distribution—are approved to distribute
foreign films in China.106 The WTO Appellate Body found that
China’s limiting of audiovisual distribution services to state-owned
Chinese enterprises breaches China’s commitments to permit
market access without discrimination.107 Following the 2009 decision, China did not reform its import or distribution regulations,
but it did at least agree to increase the number of foreign films
permitted for theatrical release each year.108
Thus, Professor Song concludes that “exogenous pressure constrained the power of the Chinese government to reshape copyright
law to suit the needs of press control,” but “[t]he nearly decade101
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103
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long double standard problem in copyright protection [during
which foreign works received broader rights than domestic works]
reveals just how reluctant the Party-state has been to remove the
imprints of press control from China’s copyright law.”109 As these
examples illustrate, censorship and market forces enabled by copyright are in considerable tension. While stronger copyright protections and market forces do not always undercut press controls, they
have consistently chipped away at them for more than two decades.
Nevertheless, scholars such as Neil Netanel and Peter Yu warn
of potential harms that could result from instituting strong and effective copyright regimes in authoritarian states, such as China,
that limit market access.110 Strong copyright under such conditions
could result in a net welfare loss by limiting the penetration—and
potential democratizing effect—of unapproved foreign works,
which are widely disseminated via pirate networks.111 Foreign
works can, after all, expose audiences in authoritarian states to alternative viewpoints, lifestyles, and systems of government.112 Taking into account the free speech implications of the nexus between
copyright protection and market access is an important point. Focusing on the potential democratizing effects of foreign works,
however, risks undervaluing the potential influence of a strong domestic industry buoyed by copyright. As argued below, a strong
domestic film industry has the resources to communicate diverse
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Song, Development of Copyright Law, supra note 18, at 301.
See Netanel, supra note 56, at 255–58; Yu, supra note 10, at 424–26. For Professor
Yu, the ideal solution to China’s market access problem “is to increase market access and
strengthen copyright protection at the same time,” but he queries “whether it would
always be beneficial to push for stronger protection of intellectual property rights if
market access, unfortunately, remains limited in China.” Yu, supra note 10, at 428.
111
While Professor Netanel is optimistic about copyright’s capacity to enhance free
speech in democratic states, he is more skeptical about its ability to induce democratic
reform in authoritarian states. His skepticism is based on several assumptions: that strong
copyright would price legitimate copies of foreign works beyond the reach of the average
consumer, and that “the meager resource base of the domestic audience [in the
authoritarian state] would significantly undercut copyright’s practical import, as would
the chronic dependence of authoritarian-state authors on state-controlled distribution
networks.” Netanel, supra note 56, at 264. These assumptions have less relevance to
China today than they did when Netanel was writing nearly two decades ago.
112
See id. at 260; Yu, supra note 10, at 425.
110

22

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:1

perspectives through more culturally resonant domestic productions, even in the guise of “officially sanctioned” content.113
II. THE FILM MARKET AND CENSORSHIP IN CHINA
This Part introduces the history of Chinese film as a state controlled medium of expression, with an emphasis on the historical
interplay between censorship and the market. Throughout the history of Chinese film, and particularly in the present day, authorities
have used a multilayered censorship approach in order to maximize
compliance while minimizing the administrative burden on the
state. First and most conspicuously, the state imposes direct content controls that withhold information from public consumption.
These generally come in two flavors: production controls (e.g.,
centrally planned projects, script approval requirements, etc.) and
post hoc review (pre-release screening and editing).114 Both types
remain prevalent in China today. Second, Chinese authorities have
employed strict licensing or permitting rules designed to limit production and distribution functions to approved entities only. Third,
Chinese authorities have imposed restrictions on investment and
ownership in film production and distribution entities.115 Fourth,
the state, especially today, relies heavily on self-censorship: production companies are responsible for policing the content they
produce and face the prospect of punishment for any transgression.
Fifth, the state encourages compliance by employing subsidies, fa113

See Priest, supra note 1, at 526–29. Professor Yu points out, however, the nuanced
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vorable release windows, and other incentives for “good behavior.”116 Sixth, to induce self-censorship, authorities impose penalties against those deemed to have transgressed censorship rules.
One common penalty is a multi-year filmmaking ban.117 Seventh,
the state has imposed varying degrees of restrictions and bans on
foreign films. Presently, China caps annual imports at thirty-four
films for revenue-sharing theatrical release (of which fourteen must
be in “enhanced” formats such as IMAX or 3-D) and restricts foreign firms’ participation in China’s film production, importation,
and distribution sectors. (China also reportedly imports an additional thirty to forty foreign films annually on a non-revenuesharing, flat fee basis.)118
As the remainder of this Part demonstrates, however, for much
of the history of Chinese cinema there has been—and continues to
be—a productive tension between censorship rules and the market.
This tension puts practical limits on how and to what degree the
state can control content.
A. Early Narrative Films and May Fourth Cinema
The Chinese film industry has existed for nearly as long as
moving pictures have existed as a medium of expression, and content control has been part of the landscape for much of that time.
The first motion picture was exhibited in China in 1896,119 and the
first Chinese silent feature films were produced in the early
116
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1920s.120 At that time, Chinese art and culture remained highly influenced by the May Fourth Movement (1917–1921), in which the
Chinese government’s perceived weakness in the face of Japanese
aggression triggered nationalism, student and worker protests, and
broader reform efforts aimed at exalting Western science and democratic values and undermining Confucian tradition.121 Although
the melodramas of the 1920s were highly commercial (and extremely popular) mass entertainment, and were shunned as such by
many May Fourth intellectuals,122 some early feature films did reflect societal concerns of the times, infusing simple stories with social and political meaning.123 Some of the most influential early
Chinese filmmakers viewed themselves as educators as well as entertainers, although their narratives unfailingly sought to promote
traditional values.124 One of China’s great screenplay writers of the
1920s, the Harvard-educated Hong Shen, refused to depict in his
films topics that might morally mislead the public, such as pornography, immortals and demons, criminal activity, exposing human
vices, and exposing the nation’s shortcomings.125 Indeed, these
very themes are technically forbidden under Chinese law today.126
Hong’s early act of “self-censorship” underscores how deeply
entwined notions of moral cultivation have been with cultural production in China, and how paternalism and concerns about the corruptive potential of film (and art more broadly) long predate the
establishment of the People’s Republic.
Many early film critics were especially preoccupied with film’s
unique educative potential.127 They viewed film’s capacity to deliver moral and nationalistic messages to the masses as a critical peda120
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gogical tool that could fill the void left by the failed school systems
across China.128 Accordingly, many critics mistrusted the market
and decried profit-oriented filmmaking.129 The tension between
moralism and commercialism even famously manifested itself within studios, leading to creative tensions between executives who
emphasized the need to produce a hit versus those who worried
about doing so at the expense of virtuous inculcation.130
B. The 1930s: Censorship Under the Guomindang
The 1930s are often regarded as a golden age of Chinese cine131
ma, ushering in a new level of artistic maturity and social consciousness and witnessing the first earnest efforts to incorporate
progressive May Fourth themes into film.132 Audiences began to
appreciate film not only as entertainment but also as a therapeutic
medium for communicating contemporary problems facing individuals and society133—a critical function following decades of war,
warlordism, and imperialism. Leftist films emerged as artistically
and politically important during this period, although their general
popularity at the time is in doubt.134
Censorship by the Guomindang government (and the foreign
powers occupying Shanghai) also emerged as a ubiquitous feature
of the film industry.135 Like the Communist Party that succeeded it,
the Guomindang engaged in two kinds of censorship: social and
political. Social censorship aimed primarily at enhancing Guomindang nation-building efforts by eliminating sex and superstition
from films, and prioritizing Mandarin films over Cantonese-dialect
and foreign films.136 Political censorship primarily targeted leftist
128
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films, which were seen as an ideological threat.137 While censorship
was widespread—in 1933 nearly a quarter of features produced in
China were banned138—it appears to have been inconsistently enforced and consisted mostly of post hoc bans and revisions, with
little direct interference in the production process. In a foreshadowing of the censor-market dialog that plays a significant role in
today’s Chinese film industry, Guomindang censors were sympathetic to the economic hardships that plagued film studios, particularly the smaller ones, and established policies to help minimize the
economic effects of censorship and even give objectionable or
banned films an opportunity to at least partially recoup their
costs.139 Guomindang censors even agreed to allow “banned” films
to enjoy a limited public release to help the producers recoup their
investments.140
C. The Mao Era: Socialist Production and Party Domination
Cinema during the Mao period (1949–1976) was primarily characterized by conformity and uniformity born of centralized state
control and production quotas disconnected from market preferences. Film production went through three phases that profoundly
affected the nature of films produced during the period: nationalization of the private studios (1949–1952), socialist realism (1953–
1966), and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).141 In Mao’s view,
cinema was a powerful ideological medium and its proper function
was to disseminate correct Party ideology.142 Hollywood films,
which were extremely popular in parts of China previously, were
banned and not officially permitted again until years after the Mao
era.143
In the earliest years of the PRC, the Party cooperated with and
subsidized private studios, which initially released dozens of propaganda films. The party’s censorship policies were opaque, however, and guessing what Chairman Mao would deem to be politically
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correct proved perilous for filmmakers. Accomplished Shanghaibased director Sun Yu found himself at the center of a political firestorm when he released The Life of Wu Xun (武训传), the most
ambitious of the privately produced propaganda features. Although
the film sought to glorify the Communist revolution, Mao excoriated it for incorrectly depicting Chinese history and portraying
peasants as reformers rather than revolutionaries.144 Feature film
production in state-owned studios ground to a halt for more than a
year as the industry stagnated in political uncertainty, while Party
officials and the press rained down criticism on private studios.145
By 1953, all the private studios in China were nationalized.146
Commentators theorize that Mao used the Wu Xun campaign to
cow the comparatively Westernized Shanghai studios, signal that
politics would now trump artistic expression, and cement the Party’s role—and Mao’s role in particular—as the arbiter of political
correctness.147 In one stroke, through the Wu Xun campaign, Mao
“consolidated his power position within the [Communist Party]
leadership and crushed the naïve dream of creative freedom held
by all artists, no matter what credentials they might possess.”148
The ensuing “socialist realism” period was named after the
Party’s credo that films should depict socialism with simultaneous
realism and idealism.149 The period witnessed the expansion of the
Chinese film industry, albeit under the complete control of the Party.150 With the film apparatus secured within the bureaucracy, the
state invested heavily in film education and the development of
new film technologies.151 The style and substance of socialist realism were confined to limited, politically acceptable parameters: the
films were generally serious in tone (often set in wartime) and sublimated character development and style to political exemplarity,
depicting model protagonists locked in class struggle.152 Neverthe144
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less, resourceful filmmakers of this period found room for artistic
expression and stylistic innovation within the confines of political
orthodoxy, particularly in the genres of ethnic minority film, traditional theater and opera film, and animation.153 A number of these
films were popular in China, and some even found popularity and
critical acclaim abroad in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Europe.154
Overall, however, the socialist realism period was a trying and
dangerous time for filmmakers, and a disappointment for Chinese
cinema. Outspoken filmmakers, emboldened to air criticisms during the 1956 One Hundred Flowers Campaign, decried an epidemic
of poor box office performance.155 Film critic Zhong Dianfei publicly noted at the time that socialist films’ target audience—workers,
peasants, and soldiers—showed little interest in them.156 He
blamed poor attendance on state interference in the creative
process and repression of directors’ individual artistic styles.157
Immediate reforms in response to the criticisms gave individual
studios more artistic control, and the fruits of the reforms were
unmistakable: production doubled and new themes, styles and genres proliferated.158 Mao and the Party leaders soon turned on their
critics,159 however, and numerous high-profile filmmakers were
discredited or banned during the ensuing Anti-Rightist Movement
of 1957.160 While film production continued apace for the next several years, the Anti-Rightist Movement dashed any hope that socialist cinema would see significant stylistic and artistic progress
under Mao.
Chinese cinema reached its nadir in 1966–1969—the tumultuous first three years of the Cultural Revolution, when feature film
production ceased entirely.161 In his call for a new socialist revolution in the sphere of culture, Mao denounced the previous seven-
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teen years of socialist filmmaking.162 For the remainder of the Cultural Revolution, film production consisted of a handful of model
revolutionary plays and operas and, later, feature films in line with
the political and aesthetic values of the ultra-leftists and Mao’s
wife Jiang Qing.163 In short, some stylistic innovations and artistic
achievements occurred during the Mao era, but style and art were
severely stunted overall by their relentless subordination to politics.164
D. The 1980s: Transition, Liberalization, and the “Fifth Generation”
Auteurs
Following Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution
in 1976, China embarked on a new period of modernization, economic reform, and international reengagement. China eagerly cast
off the repression and stagnation of the Cultural Revolution and
embarked on a new era of economic liberalization and technological
modernization under Deng Xiaoping. State investment resumed in
film production, which had slowed to a crawl during the Cultural
Revolution.165
From 1977 until the early 1990s, film production remained
within the centrally controlled state studio system established under Mao.166 While political oversight and censorship remained a
fact of life for filmmakers even throughout this period, there was
more room for creative maneuvering than in the previous three
decades. For example, several influential films that were initially
banned were ultimately released in China within a few years or
even months after officially being declared “illegal.”167 Some of
China’s most celebrated directors—often referred to collectively as
the “Fifth Generation”—emerged during this period, including
Zhang Yimou, Tian Zhuangzhuang, and Chen Kaige. These directors felt relatively free to experiment with ideological critique and
162

Id. at 217.
Id. at 219–22.
164
Id. at 208–09.
165
ZHU, supra note 127, at 52.
166
See JASON MCGRATH, POSTSOCIALIST MODERNITY: CHINESE CINEMA, LITERATURE,
AND CRITICISM IN THE MARKET AGE 131 (2008).
167
MICHAEL BERRY, SPEAKING IN IMAGES: INTERVIEWS WITH CONTEMPORARY CHINESE
FILMMAKERS 6 (2005).
163

30

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:1

auteurism.168 They were also unconstrained by market considerations, as production remained entirely state-subsidized.169 Directors in the state studio system could produce the films they wanted
within the allocated budget.170 They were unaccountable for—but
also unable to partake financially in—their films’ success.171
Thematically, Fifth Generation films were iconoclastic and distanced themselves stylistically and thematically from the films of
previous generations—particularly social realist cinema.172 The
Fifth Generation directors deconstructed revolutionary history and
undermined socialist mythology. Chen Kaige’s 1984 film Yellow
Earth (黄土地), for example, portrays rural mountain villagers who
resist change and are unresponsive to a Communist cadre’s indoctrination attempts.173 Through its minimalist plot and fragmented
narrative, the film counters the stylistic conventions of socialist
realism and the myth that peasants readily embraced socialism.174
The Fifth Generation’s films received accolades abroad, but they
generally flopped with domestic audiences, for whom the avantgarde stylings probably seemed foreign and impenetrable.175
While censors granted far more leeway in the 1980s than in the
Mao era,176 censorship was still prevalent if less intrusive.177 The
deadly crackdown on protestors at Tiananmen in 1989 cooled the
more permissive ideological environment that filmmakers enjoyed
earlier in the decade, but it did not precipitate a return to Mao-era
levels of control.178 Instead, it seems to have prompted the Party to
168
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divert resources away from art films and invest heavily in the production of “main melody” films—propaganda films designed to
reinstall correct political ideology and nationalism.179 It might also
have disillusioned some filmmakers, causing them to desert political ideals and whole-heartedly embrace commercialism.180
E. 1990s: Economic Reform and Hollywood’s Reintroduction
Maintaining a fully state-supported film sector disassociated
from the market was untenable. Box office numbers declined drastically through the late 1980s and early 1990s due to a lack of popular interest in much of the domestic cinema, a lack of foreign films,
and a panoply of new entertainment options competing for consumers’ discretionary income. Declines in box office returns triggered a vicious cycle. Decreased revenue begat lower investment in
production. In 1992, the most expensive Chinese film produced
cost a mere $187,500.181 In addition, the government still enforced
a production quota of 120 films per year, further spreading budgets
thin.182 The low investment undermined film quality, rendering
film products even less attractive to audiences.183 By 1993, many
Chinese studios had to rely on co-production arrangements with
Taiwanese and Hong Kong studios in order to produce films.184 In
just one year, between 1992 and 1993, purely domestic productions
had fallen by fifty percent, audience attendance by sixty percent,
and box office returns and distribution net income by forty percent.185
By this time, many areas of China’s economy were undergoing
profound economic reform, and the need for market-based reform
in the film sector became self-evident. In 1993, the Ministry of Ra259 (“At first sight, the military crackdown in Tiananmen of 1989 did not leave any direct
impact on mainland filmmaking . . . .”).
179
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dio, Film, and Television (“MRFT”) outlined a plan for transitioning state production and distribution to a market-based model,
emphasizing film’s economic function and, in the words of Professor Ying Zhu, “endorsing a cinematic practice not necessarily in
alignment with film’s pedagogical function.”186 The state-run studios, which were still the only studios permitted to produce films at
this time, concentrated their reform efforts primarily on downsizing, internal restructuring, talent outsourcing, and tying employee
bonuses to profits.187 While the reforms improved studio management, they did little to solve several root causes of the studios’
troubles: low revenue, lack of sufficient financing, and lack of creativity and modern film production standards as a result of decades
of filmmakers working under state patronage and censorship.188
Most importantly, the reform efforts did nothing to bring audiences back to theaters.189
Market-based reforms and officials’ urgent desire to jump-start
the domestic film market led to the repealing of the ban on theatrical exhibition of revenue-sharing foreign films in the mid-1990s.190
Authorities hoped that by showing a limited number of Western
films, with their higher production values and wider range of subject matter, audiences would be enticed back into theaters and rekindle the movie-going habit, reenergizing the market for domestic
films in the process.191 In 1994, the MRFT issued a reform measure
permitting the import of ten foreign films per year (mostly Hollywood blockbusters) for theatrical release on a revenue-sharing basis.192 Following China’s entry into the WTO, that number
doubled.193 In 2012, Chinese authorities again increased the number, this time to thirty-four.194 This course of action by the MRFT
had little to do with ideology and everything to do with the market
186
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(and international pressure—also a function of the market). Even
the first few waves of Hollywood films contained movies that were
expected to perform well at the box office but potentially raised
thorny content issues at the time, such as Oliver Stone’s violent
and political Natural Born Killers and John Woo’s violent action
film Broken Arrow.195
During this period, Chinese officials also actively wooed Hollywood in an effort to entice foreign investment in new productions
and gain foreign distribution for Chinese films. Chinese officials
crowed that co-productions are treated as domestic productions
and therefore provide an avenue for Hollywood studios to circumvent the import cap and receive twice the revenue share of imported films.196 Chinese officials also promised to grant “preferential consideration” in the Chinese market to foreign companies that
purchased overseas distribution rights for Chinese films.197 Warner
Bros. and Twentieth Century Fox are reportedly two major studios
that developed favorable relationships with Chinese officials by
purchasing such rights.198
The reintroduction of Hollywood was not the only major step
that the MRFT took in 1995 to revitalize Chinese film production.
To help domestic producers compete with the onslaught of imports, the MRFT made policy changes to open up the film production sector. Prior to 1995, only sixteen licensed state-owned studios
could invest in and produce films.199 The MRFT loosened its licensing policy to permit provincial level studios to participate in
film production.200 More importantly, it opened up film production
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to outside investors201 (later regulations clarified that outside investors eligible to invest in film production do not include wholly foreign-owned entities, although foreign companies could invest
through joint ventures with Chinese entities).202 In addition, the
studio reforms of the mid-1990s, partly as a result of Hollywood’s
reintroduction, led to reforms in the distribution sector that opened
it up to private investment and Hollywood-style vertically integrated marketing and management in which the film producer, distributor, and exhibitor shared in profits and losses.203
By the end of 1995, the MRFT’s plan appeared to have worked.
Audiences returned to theaters in droves to see the “big ten” Hollywood imports, and the return of the theater-going habit gave domestic films an immediate boost.204 Private investment flooded into domestic film production. With Hollywood production values
now setting the standard, Chinese producers were forced to acknowledge that quality films with high production values were key
to attracting audiences, and several large budget Chinese films
were released that year. While the Hollywood imports claimed seventy to eighty percent of the Chinese box office in 1995, domestic
films fared admirably: domestic co-production Red Cherry, which
was the number one domestic film that year, surpassed most of the
Hollywood blockbusters.205 It also quickly became apparent that
private investment was key to producing films that could compete
in this new landscape, as the majority of the state-run studio productions were “box-office turkeys” in 1995.206
The Chinese film industry’s resurgence was exceedingly shortlived, however, because state censors reinserted themselves. In an
201
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atmosphere in which the rapid onset of commercial culture resulted in “spiritually polluting” literature, music, and art,207 film
also entered the crosshairs of culture authorities. Private profiteers
inexperienced at filmmaking rushed to enter the fray, and the proliferation of low budget films depicting gratuitous sex and violence
dismayed officials.208 The MRFT called for the production of ten
“quality” domestic films (which studios interpreted to mean main
melody films) annually209 and, in order to provide further protection, revenue, and concomitant investment in domestic production, they required exhibitors to allocate no more than one-third of
their screen time to foreign films.210 In 1996, therefore, the diminished screen time for foreign films and the devotion of much of
the remaining screen time to socialist hero main melody films
turned away audiences and private investors alike.211 The tightening of state control over studios at this time “resulted in monotonous cinematic representation and the avoidance of controversial
contemporary subjects more attuned to the concerns of ordinary
moviegoers.”212 Another consequence was that some film exhibitors, sensing the domestic studios’ anxiety over the marketability
of their main melody films, exploited the studios by demanding
they take lower revenue shares and cover costs not customarily
borne by the studio.213
Despite the market-oriented transition and promising developments for Chinese filmmakers, censorship remained a consistent
drag on the industry’s reform efforts.214 Inconsistent, shifting, and
opaque censorship rules often led filmmakers to err on the side of
caution and avoid controversial subjects of the day, or invest in politically (though not economically) safe main melody productions,
giving film practitioners experience producing only a narrow range
of films.215 Therefore, as Professor Zhu notes, “even when film
207
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reform returned to the Chinese filmmakers much of the control
over their creative processes and products, they had difficulty in
making the transition from a cinema of propaganda to a cinema of
popular appeal and commercial entertainment.”216 Nevertheless,
the 1990s witnessed the advent of key reforms that would save the
Chinese film industry a decade later, spurred by commercialization: modernization and privatization of the production and distribution sectors, and the introduction of foreign content, capital, and
expertise into the Chinese film market.
F. 2000 to the Present: The Rise of China’s Film Industry
The problems that plagued the industry in the 1990s, coupled
with rampant VCD and DVD piracy,217 continued to stunt the Chinese film industry’s growth well into the new millennium. As recently as 2005, annual box office revenue in China amounted to
just $250 million (inclusive of both foreign and domestic films)—a
mere three percent of the U.S. box office total that year.218
However, the seeds of future success were sewn when, in the
1990s, officials permitted private investment in theaters and distribution.219 By 2014, China had replaced Japan as the world’s second
largest box office.220 China’s 2014 box office proceeds reached
$4.76 billion, and by 2016 China is likely to become the first country besides the United States to cross the $5 billion sales threshold
in a single year.221 The confluence of three factors has resulted in
an unprecedented Chinese film industry boom.222 First, the past
decade has witnessed a meteoric rise in the number of theaters.
Today, theater chains are building 5,000 screens per year in China,
which now boasts 25,000 screens nationwide223—more than
216
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double the number of screens that existed in 2011.224 Screen installations were initially concentrated in first-tier cities such as Beijing
and Shanghai but now even fifth and sixth-tier cities are experiencing the boom.225 Second, the quality of the movie-going experience
has improved dramatically during the past decade. This includes
quality of the physical spaces in which films are exhibited as stateof-the-art cinemas with stadium seating, IMAX screens, and 3-D
projection proliferate nationwide.226 It also includes a significant
rise in content quality as the number of imports and co-productions
with high production values increases and purely homegrown productions, spurred by global competition, improve dramatically.
Third, Chinese consumers’ discretionary spending has increased
markedly—particularly that of young, white collar Chinese who are
the most avid filmgoers.227 Although first-run blockbuster films can
cost as much as twenty-six to twenty-eight dollars per ticket,228
moviegoing has become an essential social and leisurely pursuit for
many young Chinese.229
China’s domestic film industry has grown with the meteoric
rise in box office revenue. Currently, box office receipts for domestic films are about equal to that of foreign films,230 and six of the ten
highest grossing films in China are domestic productions, all of
which were released in 2010 or later.231 Some of this assuredly derives from economic protectionist policies instituted in the 1990s,
224
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such as limiting the annual screen time available to foreign films232
and instituting “blackout” periods during which only domestic
films can be shown.233 However, there are signs that the Chinese
film industry is now successfully competing on its merits.234 Hollywood films, which are exceedingly popular in first tier cites such
as Beijing and Shanghai, are less popular in other, less cosmopolitan cities.235 Audiences in these cities are more interested in local
fare emphasizing themes that resonate with their experiences and
feature popular Chinese television stars.236 According to Variety, a
major U.S. film industry trade publication, in 2013 China produced
domestic “megahits” at a rate of about one per month, and about
half of those were by first-time or little-known directors.237 In any
event, rumblings are steadily growing that, as a result of U.S. pressure, the import cap will be raised yet again or removed altogether
by 2017.238 If other market access barriers are lifted as well, Chinese filmmakers will be forced to compete on the quality and attractiveness of their content alone.
The effect of commercialization on both Chinese film production and censorship practices over the past decade is palpable. By
the turn of the century, entertaining the potentially enormous audience in China—and scoring the associated potential riches—had
become most Chinese filmmakers’ focus, rather than producing
state-sponsored main melody films for the state or art-house films
for a small circle of critics.239 At that time, to keep from running
afoul of censors, producers tended to stick to a few dominant
232
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themes considered noncontroversial: histories (that did not twist
the Party’s historical narrative), martial arts films (exemplified by
Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Zhang Yimou’s Hero,
and Peter Chan Ho-sun’s The Warlords),240 and urban comedies
(exemplified by Feng Xiaogang’s wildly successful satirical comedies about modern life).241 However, the narrow subject matter
range made the films difficult to differentiate.242 Established directors with bankable names made many of these films, especially in
the history and martial arts genres. Up-and-coming directors and
former “underground” filmmakers that sought mainstream acceptance and success, on the other hand, have continually needed to
distinguish themselves. They have done so by pushing the
envelope of acceptable content,243 and many have sought to bring
that edge to the commercial mainstream.244 As Variety magazine
recently wrote in a cover story on the rise of China’s domestic film
industry, “[y]oung filmmakers are no longer forced to work underground and have chipped away at the regulators’ hard lines (and
their own cautionary self-censorship) to produce genre films in
formats from horror to thriller to romantic comedy.”245
High-profile co-productions and foreign investment in films
such as Looper, a sci-fi thriller about futuristic hit-men who travel
to China sixty years in the future, Transformers: Age of Extinction,
and Iron Man 3 provide three things that Chinese officials particularly value: capital, training, and high production values. However,
such films need to generate strong returns in order for financiers
and producers to invest in future China projects. Forcing producers of such films to strictly adhere to regulations that forbid eminently marketable subject matter such as violence, murder, the underworld, crime, sex or sexual innuendo, and horror would (for bet240

Frater, supra note 225.
See MCGRATH, supra note 166, at 165.
242
Frater, supra note 225.
243
See PICKOWICZ, supra note 122, at 329.
244
See id. at 334–35 (describing how many underground filmmakers in China in fact
make daring underground films with the ultimate goal of becoming mainstream
filmmakers and, for many, having the luxury of “mov[ing] back and forth aboveground
and underground in order to address the different consumer needs and interests of both
foreign and domestic viewers”).
245
Frater, supra note 225.
241

40

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:1

ter or worse) greatly hamper their ability to market the films. This
is especially true for filmmakers seeking to produce globally marketable films in China: censoring authorities simply must take into
account global tastes and consumption habits when reviewing
films. Although some co-productions, including Looper and Iron
Man 3, result in two prints—one for Chinese consumption and one
for global consumption246—the Chinese version might even contain more, rather than less content in order to ensure that it contains proportionally sufficient “Chinese” themes to qualify for coproduction status, and to make it more attractive to Chinese audiences.247
In sum, this Part has aimed to demonstrate that autocratic,
complete top-down control of the film industry is an aberration of
the Mao era. Indeed, the history of China’s film industry demonstrates that despotic dominion over film production is neither sustainable nor desirable, even from the state’s point of view. While
censorship—in celebrated director Feng Xiaogang’s words—
“torments”248 China’s filmmakers and has done so throughout
much of history, censorship has also been tempered by market demands and by the ineluctable impulse of filmmakers to differentiate
themselves from their forebears, to satiate those market demands,
or both. That said, the market clearly is not all-powerful. Chinese
producers still create under the pall of a pervasive censorship apparatus, and while the scope of acceptable subject matter today may
be far broader than in past decades, the censorship process remains
opaque and ad hoc, and there are major political and social themes
of central importance to Chinese society that remain off limits.
Films directly criticizing the Party, its ideology, or its leaders
would be wildly successful if officially released,249 but those and
246

See ZHU, supra note 127, at 151 (noting that the China Film Co-Production
Corporation, as early as the 1990s, “made important concessions to allow two different
prints for all co-productions, one for domestic release and one for international release”).
247
See Priest, supra note 1, at 492 & n.142.
248
EVAN OSNOS, AGE OF AMBITION: CHASING FORTUNE, TRUTH, AND FAITH IN THE
NEW CHINA 320 (2014) (quoting Feng Xiaogang).
249
Cf. Song, Development of Copyright Law, supra note 18, at 295 (noting that in China’s
book publishing industry, books by dissident writers such as Liu Xiaobo that critique the
establishment are extremely popular and therefore “become the favorites of private
publishers” despite the political risks involved). Book publishing has occurred under the
purview of a different censoring authority. See generally id. Given the structure of the
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many other subjects plainly remain untouchable, demonstrating the
limits of the market’s power over censors. The next Part considers
whether the gains that market forces have made are meaningful to
Chinese society despite the obvious limitations.
COPYRIGHT-INDUCED LIBERALIZATION OF CHINA’S
CENSORSHIP PRACTICES AND RULES
This Part considers whether the market-induced liberalizations
of China’s film censorship practices and rules have led to meaningful gains over time in terms of expressive freedom in China’s film
market. “Free expression” here can be evaluated along two dimensions: (1) plurality of voices and viewpoints in films lawfully distributed in China, and (2) diversity of approved film subject matter.
Changes along these dimensions can be observed through the extent to which market pressures lead to formal liberalization of the
rules or films technically violate censorship rules.
To aid this inquiry, this Part first provides a very brief outline
of pertinent censorship rules. It then analyzes how these rules have
been applied in practice or have changed as a result of market pressures. Lastly, this Part draws from political science literature on
Chinese economic reform to provide a theoretical basis for arguing
that the selective enforcement of rules, combined with (or indeed
driven by) market forces and economic realities, can lead to meaningful (albeit not absolute) liberalization and reform of formal
rules.
III.

A. China’s Film Censorship Regulations
As noted at the beginning of Part II, the Chinese government
uses a multilayered censorship approach that involves content censorship, licensing and permitting requirements, investment restricpublishing industry and the industry’s relationship to the censoring authority, book
publishers have been able (and indeed, are often forced by circumstances) to take more
risk. For the difference between censorship in the book publishing and film industries, see
Yu Hua, Censorship’s Many Faces, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, at A29 (“China has more
than 500 publishing houses, each with its own editor in chief (and de facto censor); if a
book is rejected by one publisher there’s still a chance another will take it. In contrast,
films are not released until officials in the state cinema bureau in Beijing are satisfied, and
once a film is banned it has no hope of being screened.”).
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tions, self-censorship, rewards and subsidies, and import restrictions.250 This Section will briefly introduce the censorship regulations most pertinent to this discussion, in particular, film content
censorship rules, permitting requirements, and investment restrictions.
As films and filmmakers, both foreign and domestic, proliferate
in China, the state has sought to maintain a tight grip on content
and production through restrictive content and licensing requirements. Throughout the 1990s, the government issued a series of
regulations that outlined rules concerning media entity ownership
and verboten content.251 Article 3 of the 1994 Audiovisual Product
Management Regulations enumerated a list of six general categories of forbidden content, which are repeated in more recent regulations:
(1) Content that endangers the unity and territorial
integrity of the nation and sovereignty of the
State;
(2) Content that incites the division of the
ethnicities and undermines national solidarity;
(3) Content that divulges State secrets;
250

See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
See Dianying Shencha Guiding (电影审查规定) [Film Examination Regulations]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television, Jan. 16, 1997) (China),
translated in Film Examination Regulations, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/1997/01/16/film-examinationregulations/ [http://perma.cc/WLK9-R2ZR] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015); Dianying Guanli
Tiaoli (电影管理条例) [Film Management Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council,
May 29, 1996, effective July 1, 1996) (China), translated in Film Management Regulations,
CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/
1996/06/15/film-management-regulations/ [http://perma.cc/8M7Z-SZ68] (last visited
Oct. 1, 2015); Yin Xiang Zhipin Guanli Tiaoli (音像制品管理条例) [Audiovisual
Products Management Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 25, 1994,
effective Oct. 1, 1994) (China) [hereinafter Audiovisual Products Management
Regulations], translated in Audiovisual Products Management Regulations, CHINA
COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/1994/08/25/
audiovisual-products-management-regulations/ [http://perma.cc/2FVA-VMGD] (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015); Dianying Shencha Zan Hang Guiding (电影审查暂行规定)
[Provisional Film Examination Regulations] (promulgated by the Ministry of Radio, Film,
and Television, Apr. 21, 1993, effective June 4, 1993) (China), translated in Provisional
COPYRIGHT
AND
MEDIA,
Film
Examination
Regulations,
CHINA
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/1993/06/04/provisional-filmexamination-regulations/ [http://perma.cc/MXZ2-P2KT] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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(4) Content that propagates obscenity and
superstition or glorifies violence;
(5) Content that slanders or insults others; [and]
(6) Other content of which the publication and
dissemination are prohibited by State
provisions.252
Clearly, much of this list targets content viewed as seditious
and politically sensitive, although it does touch broadly on socially
objectionable content as well, such as violence and slanderousness.
(These, too, however, have political undertones, as showing scenes
of graphic violence can in theory lead to unruliness and political
instability, and “slanderous” content may target party officials or
Revolutionary figures.) Of particular note are the list’s vagueness
and the exceptional breadth of subject matter that it covers. Indeed, item six essentially affords the Party-state carte blanche to
censor content at will. The Chinese word for “provisions” (规定)
is a broad term that could be interpreted to include any rule or stipulation that originates from a state organ. Hence, if any state organ, including the censoring body, declares something to be illegal,
that content violates article 3(6). In any event, nothing in the film
regulations requires authorities to provide a justification for banning a film or requiring revisions, and they often do not provide
one. Unsurprisingly, filmmakers lament the ad hoc nature of censorship:
The censorship system is very ridiculous, for there
is no standard. They say, “Your films are illegal,”
and then I ask, “What is the relevant film law?
Which clause do my films violate?” No, there is no
specific law. So the censorship is quite cruel. If they
say your film is “illegal,” it is “illegal.”253
In keeping with the traditional Chinese view that expressive
works are morally and psychologically influential and therefore
should edify with “correct” ideology and positive themes and imagery, the 2006 Film Management Regulations (promulgated by
252

Audiovisual Products Management Regulations, supra note 251, art. 3.
LUCY MONTGOMERY, CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: COPYRIGHT, SOCIAL
NETWORK MARKETS, AND THE BUSINESS OF CULTURE IN A DIGITAL AGE 50 (2010)
(quoting filmmaker Li Yang).
253
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the MRFT’s successor, the State Administration of Radio, Film,
and Television (“SARFT”))254 encourage filmmakers to produce
films that “support healthy and beneficial culture, strive to transform backward culture, [and] determinedly resist degenerate culture.”255 The 2006 regulation contains the same list of verboten
political subject matter as the 1994 regulation quoted above, but
enumerates additional censorship-worthy topics, with an emphasis
on such socially “unhealthy” or corrupting subject matter as violence, horror, graphic sexuality, criminal activity, showing the
dark side of modern Chinese society, or simply presenting a pessimistic rather than uplifting outlook on life.256 Specifically, according to the 2006 regulation, any film must be edited or revised if it:







254

disagrees with or alters Party narratives about
historical facts and individuals, including
“twisting Chinese culture and Chinese history,
gravely violating historical facts,” or criticizing
Revolutionary heroes, the army, or the police;
contains graphic sexual content including the
depiction of “promiscuity, rape, prostitution,
sexual behavior, homosexuality, masturbation,
male and female genitalia and other intimate
parts; intermittent filthy lines, songs,
background music and sound effects;”
contains horror, violence, monsters, and gore;
“blur[s] the basic nature of righteousness and
unrighteousness; sedulously display[s] unlawful
or criminal aggressiveness and arrogance;”
graphically portrays violence or crimes such as
murder, drug use, and gambling;

In 2013, SARFT merged with the General Administration of Press and Publication
(“GAPP”) to form the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and TV
(“SAPPRFT”).
255
See Dianyingjuben (Genggai) Beian, Dianyingpian Guanli Guiding (电影剧本 (梗概)
备案, 电影片管理规定) [Film Script (Outline) Filing, Film Management Regulations]
(promulgated by the St. Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, Apr. 3, 2006, effective
June 22, 2006), art. 12 (China) [hereinafter Film Script (Outline) Filing], translated in
Film Script (Outline) Filing, Film Management Regulations, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA,
http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2006/05/22/film-script-outline-filingfilm-management-regulations [http://perma.cc/NYD6-9JL5] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
256
Id. art. 14.
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portrays “bad habits” such as excessive
drinking and smoking;
casts police in a negative light by showing
prisoner abuse or “extortion of confession by
torturing criminals or criminal suspects;”
portrays society and life in a dark, negative, or
dispiriting manner;
“advocates religious extremism,” provokes
conflicts between worshippers of different
religions or between believers and non-believers,
or hurts “the feelings of the masses;”
“propagates the destruction of the natural
environment, abuse of animals, catching, killing
and eating of State-protected animals;” or
generally violates “the spirit of relevant laws
and regulations.”257

In addition to the more formal content regulations, SARFT also issues sporadic “notices.”258 For example, SARFT’s 2011 ban
on television dramas containing time travel plot elements arrived in
the form of an ad hoc notice.259 Time travel dramas reportedly
raised SARFT’s ire following the extreme popularity of several serials in which a modern-day protagonist travels back in time and
consorts, often romantically, with well-known historical figures.260
While such plot devices seem innocuous enough, they can undermine official histories or visions of the future, and comparisons

257

Id. arts. 12, 14.
See Creemers, supra note 114, at 97.
259
See Guangdian Zongju Guanyu 2011 Nian 3 Yue Quan Guo Paishe Zhizuo Dianshiju
Beian Gongshi De Tongzhi (广电总局关于2011年3月全国拍摄制作电视剧备案公示的
通知) [Notice Concerning the Nationwide Television Drama Shooting Filing
Announcement for March 2011] (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Radio, Film, and
Television, Mar. 29, 2011, effective Mar. 29, 2011) (China), translated in Notice
Concerning the Nationwide Television Drama Shooting Filing Announcement for March 2011,
CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2011/
03/29/notice-concerning-the-nationwide-television-drama-shooting-filingannouncement-for-march-2011/ [http://perma.cc/4KE2-WQ4H] (last visited Oct. 31,
2015).
260
See Priest, supra note 1, at 492.
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with the past or future can be used—and traditionally have been
used—to criticize policies of the present.261
For Chinese films aiming for theatrical release on the mainland,
censorship review begins prior to filming. A filmmaker must submit
to SARFT an outline of the script for approval before filming can
commence.262 At one film set visited by a writer for The Economist,
the writer was told that the script had been revised approximately
twenty times, and censors only agreed to approve the film after a
sympathetic communist hero was written in.263 Films that do not
undergo preproduction review are still frequently made in China,
but their distribution options are limited to underground distribution, online distribution through one of China’s popular video
streaming websites such as Youku.com or LeTV, or overseas distribution.264
State control extends not only to content, it also extends to
every aspect of film production, including governing who can invest in and produce a film project. However, as suggested above in
Part II.E, the need to privatize and commercialize film production
has led to significant liberalization in these areas since the mid1990s. Prior to that time, only state funding could be used in film
production. Subsequently, private entities, with the exception of
foreign-owned entities, have been permitted (and encouraged) to
invest in the film sector. In 2002, SARFT liberalized its production
rules further to allow private (non-foreign-owned) companies to
apply for one-off film production permits.265 Two years later it revised its regulations again to permit private companies to apply directly for a permanent film production permit (under certain circumstances).266
261

Id.
See Dianying Guanli Tiaoli (电影管理条例) [Film Administrative Regulations]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002), art. 8 (China)
[hereinafter Film Administrative Regulations], translated in Film Management Regulations
(Revised), CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.
wordpress.com/2001/12/25/film-management-regulations-revised/
[http://perma.cc/GE9A-F2T3] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
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The Red Carpet, supra note 229.
264
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Film Administrative Regulations, supra note 262, art. 8.
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Foreign investment and participation in mainland film production is now permitted in the form of joint ventures and coproductions with local partners so long as the foreign equity stake
does not exceed forty-nine percent.267 Co-production is an increasingly popular model for Hollywood studios because the studio is
directly involved in production, foreign studios can take advantage
of cheaper labor and equipment costs by filming in China, and since
co-productions are treated as domestic films they are not subject to
the import cap and are eligible for a higher revenue share.268 As
“domestic” Chinese films, however, co-productions are ostensibly
subject to the same approval and content censorship rules as all
other domestic productions.269 In addition, at least one-third of the
“main cast” of any foreign-Sino co-production must be Chinese
nationals,270 and the production should “abide by Chinese” laws
and aim to promote China’s economic and cultural prosperity.271

Entry Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, June
15, 2004, effective Nov. 10, 2004), art. 5 (China), translated in Provisional Film Enterprises
Business Qualification Entry Regulations, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA,
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2004/10/10/provisional-filmenterprises-business-qualification-entry-regulations/
[http://perma.cc/JEZ5-N5UH]
(last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
267
Id. art. 6.
268
See Film Script (Outline) Filing, supra note 255, art. 3 (stipulating that the script
preview requirements also apply to foreign–Sino co-productions); Zhong Wai Hezuo
Shezhi Dianyingpian Guanli Guiding (中外合作摄制电影片管理规定) [The Stipulation
of Administration on Chinese-Foreign Film Co-Production] (promulgated by the St.
Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, June 15, 2004, effective Aug. 10, 2004), art. VI
(China) [hereinafter Stipulation of Administration on Chinese-Foreign Film CoProduction], translated in The Stipulation of Administration on Chinese-Foreign Film CoProduction, CHINA FILM CO-PRODUCTION CORP., http://www.cfcc-film.com.cn/policeg/
content/id/1.html [http://perma.cc/62M6-ASDR] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); ZHU,
supra note 127, at 82 (noting that for many co-productions in the 1990s, a major impetus
for using that model was to take advantage of cheaper labor and equipment in the Chinese
market).
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See Stipulation of Administration on Chinese-Foreign Film Co-Production, supra
note 268, art. XVI; Priest, supra note 1, at 492.
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See Stipulation of Administration on Chinese-Foreign Film Co-Production, supra
note 268, art. XIII.
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See id. art. VI.
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B. The Market’s Effect on Censorship Rules and Practice
1. The Market’s Role in Liberalizing Censorship Rules
As evidenced above in Part II, market forces and foreign pressure have had a demonstrable liberalizing effect on formal rules designed to secure state control over film production. Less than two
decades ago, only state work units were eligible to produce or invest in domestic productions (with the exception of coproductions). Because Chinese film productions had to be selfsustaining, and therefore more attractive to consumers, because
they had to compete with high production value Hollywood content, and because China was aiming to join the WTO, officials felt
compelled to open the film sector up to private investment and allow the importation and distribution of foreign content.272 Just a
few years later, in 2002, the same market and international pressures (a function of global film commercialization) pushed SARFT
to approve private companies for film production.273 By 2004, the
rules were revised yet again to permit even foreign companies to
directly invest in and jointly produce “domestic” Chinese films.
More recently, SARFT decentralized the censorship review
process for domestic films, placing review authority in the hands of
regional rather than central government officials.274 The decentralization effort was spurred by attempts to be more responsive to
filmmakers’ needs and increase content review turnaround times.
While it remains unclear how much this system will liberalize censorship practices, director Jia Zhangke, whose films have been the
subject of high-profile bans, observed that “[i]f the power is not
that centralized, it is also a signal that the censorship system will
make some changes.”275
In sum, in less than a decade, market forces pressed Chinese
authorities to move from a system in which only domestic films
could be distributed in theaters on a revenue-sharing basis and only
272
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See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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state-owned studios could produce and invest in domestic films, to
one in which foreign blockbusters compete head-to-head with domestic films and almost anyone, Chinese or foreign, can invest in
and produce a film in China.
2. The Market’s Effect on Censorship Practice: Approval of
Films that Technically Violate Content Censorship Rules
The regulations that demonstrably changed as a result of market pressures have tended to be regulations governing investment
and production. One reason Chinese officials may have been willing to make such significant changes in such a short period of time
is that they doubtless operate under the belief that content control,
regardless of who produced or financed the film, is the key. Accordingly, while SARFT liberalized its rules governing licensing and
investment, it simultaneously tightened and expanded its rules governing content.
Although SARFT content regulations are getting increasingly
strict, films are consistently released that violate the rules. Seemingly countless films, domestic and foreign alike, repeatedly violate SARFT proscriptions against graphic violence, murder, criminal activity, horrific imagery, and gore.276 Some examples from
2014 alone include the Hollywood films Transformers: Age of Extinction (the 2014 China box office champion), X-Men: Days of Future Past, Captain America: The Winter Soldier, The Hobbit: The Desolation of Smaug, and Edge of Tomorrow. Many recent domestic
films depict graphic violence, as the discussion that follows demonstrates; and domestic horror productions are increasingly common
including the 2014 hit The House that Never Dies (京城81号) and
other recent popular films such as Midnight Whisper
(半夜叫你别回头), Who in the Mirror (半夜不要照镜子), and
Blood Stained Shoes (绣花鞋).
While violence, gore, and horrific subject matter are now commonplace in Chinese theaters, these are not the only kinds of technically verboten subjects that frequently pass censorship. For example, Breakup Buddies (心花路放) by mainland director Ning
Hao is a comedy in which a recent divorcee and his best friend take
276

See supra Part III.A.
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a road trip filled with misadventures.277 Many have complained
that the film is rife with sexual innuendo, provocative scenes, and
frank discussion of a one-night stand.278 The China Daily reported
that many parents had unwittingly taken their children to see the
“vulgar” film, and children could be heard in the theater asking
their parents such questions as, “[w]hat is a condom?”279 Regardless, the film was a blockbuster, placing second overall in the Chinese box office for 2014 and earning nearly $190 million.280 The
film’s bawdy reputation doubtless had plenty to do with its success,
but the film had the makings of a hit regardless, as Ning had directed hit films in the past, and the lead actors in Breakup Buddies
had recently paired up in one of the biggest hits in Chinese film history, the irreverent comedy Lost in Thailand.281 Domestic hits are
key to the Chinese film industry’s vitality, sustainability, and competitiveness with foreign imports—a factor that likely figured into
the censorship review board’s decision when approving the film for
distribution.
One of Ning’s previous films, No Man’s Land (无人区) (2013),
was banned for three years.282 The violent Chinese neo-“Western”
about a series of murders and double-crossings that take place in
rural Xinjiang province (a locale that happens to be a center of political unrest) portrays the murder of a policeman among other
graphic depictions of violence, murder, and other crimes. The film,
which has been favorably compared to the wryly nihilistic films of

277
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Buddies” Criticized for Being Too Vulgar for Children], CHINA DAILY (Oct. 14, 2014),
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Joel and Ethan Coen,283 was publicly criticized on the blog of a
SARFT censorship official for being “trashy,” having “depraved”
characters, allowing the guilty to remain at large in the end, depicting police as “stupid and incompetent,” and “harming China’s
national image.”284 Nevertheless, the film was ultimately released
in China, some say after significant modifications,285 and was an
instant hit, earning $42 million in the first month following its release.286
2013 box office hit Drug War (毒战), a China-Hong Kong coproduction by celebrated Hong Kong director Johnnie To, was allegedly inspired by real-life Chinese mafia trials.287 The film performed well at the Chinese box office and received critical acclaim
abroad.288 It is packaged as a gangster thriller, but it takes on a
number of controversial subjects including the illegal drug trade in
China and prisoner execution.289 The story, which takes place in
the Chinese city of Jinhai, involves a captured drug lord who seeks
lighter sentencing in exchange for helping a shrewd police captain
in a major sting operation. During the climactic gun battle between
gang members and narcotics officers, virtually all of the officers,
including the protagonist captain, are savagely killed in graphic fashion.290 Drug War is the first Chinese film to graphically depict
details of the drug trade, including how drugs are smuggled in the
283
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human body and methamphetamine production.291 It was also the
first to graphically depict a prisoner execution by lethal injection.292
While To, like any director in China, did not have creative carte
blanche, he still clearly had wide creative latitude and used it to powerful, thought-provoking effect. As New York Times critic Manhola Dargis observes:
[W]hile Mr. To may not fill the movie with rousing
speeches, either by inclination or out of political necessity, the brilliant, unsettling action scenes—ugly,
savage, dehumanizing—speak volumes. (This is one
of the rare times that the Hong Kong master has
shot on the mainland, and if he faced any pressure
from China’s censors to soften his material, it isn’t
evident to an outsider.)293
To be sure, Drug War betrays the fingerprints of ham-handed
censors. The narcotics police are uncompromisingly valorous and
self-sacrificing, and conspicuously devoid of moral reflection, fragility, or doubt about their methods or the policies they enforce.294
The cartoonishly exaggerated ill effects of drug use come across
with all the realism and subtlety, one critic quips, of a public service announcement by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America.295
Even when the film ostensibly walks the party line, however, it
manages to make a statement. The two-dimensional treatment of
the narcotics officers, one critic suggests, only makes the criminals
seem more human and sympathetic by comparison.296 Depictions
of gangsters running amok in a crowded Chinese city might appear
to justify the pervasive state surveillance the film depicts, but shots
that linger on rows of security cameras at seemingly every intersection, and the repeated use of surveillance footage to depict key
291
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events, are a constant reminder that everyone—not just criminals—live under the eye of the surveillance state. And while the
film does not overtly question China’s draconian drug laws that
make even trafficking a capital offense,297 the final scene, in which
the antagonist’s execution is depicted in methodical, unflinching,
close-up, and clinical detail, will inculcate in many viewers a feeling
of discomfort or even compassion despite the prisoner’s monstrous
deeds.
The film violates SARFT content rules by concentrating on the
darkest elements in Chinese society—depicting a criminal underworld already deeply infiltrating Chinese cities and bringing acts of
savagery and murder to the streets in broad daylight. Thus, even
the director was surprised when the film reportedly passed censorship review with minimal revisions.298 Despite its potentially problematic subject matter, the film, with its action-packed luster and
critical acclaim, is doubtless the kind of film Chinese officials like
to see in the market competing with Hollywood films and driving
audiences to theaters. The desire to see such films achieve commercial success limits censors’ ability to restrict filmmakers’ creative choices.
Zhang Yimou’s 2014 film Coming Home (归来) explores the
emotional and psychological trauma of a family rent asunder by the
Cultural Revolution, and the painful reconciliation thereafter. The
film is widely regarded as an allegory for the nation’s own difficult
reconciliation with that painful period.299 The film’s release in
297
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China and respectable domestic box office returns of $48 million
contrast with Zhang’s 1994 film To Live (或者), which also explored a family decimated by the Cultural Revolution.300 To Live
was banned in China, and Zhang was banned from filmmaking for
two years as punishment for making the film.301
It is worth pausing to note that China’s “underground” filmmaking scene also tests the boundaries of acceptable content, although the role of underground films in pressuring censors should
not be overstated. Underground films differ from “aboveground”
films in that they do not undergo or complete censorship review302
and are ineligible for official distribution in China (although today
many such films are made available on online streaming platforms).303 Underground films do sometimes delve into forbidden
subject matter, from controversial political topics to sensitive social
themes such as homosexuality.304 Despite the “underground” label, however, most of these films are actually made with the state’s
full knowledge and tacit consent.305 Underground films provide an
outlet for new voices and perspectives and are an unofficial testing
ground for controversial subject matter. Nevertheless, their effect
on expanding the boundaries of officially tolerated speech is likely
limited. Most underground films do not take on highly sensitive
subject matter, and even those that do almost always stop short of
directly criticizing the Party.306 Thus the differences between underground films and approved films that test the boundaries are
often not all that stark. Moreover, the line between underground
and aboveground films and filmmakers is often blurry. For example, some famous directors of approved films alternate between
official and unofficial projects.307 Many unestablished underground
movies/review-in-coming-home-a-family-rocked-by-the-cultural-revolution.html
[http://perma.cc/V8YD-XD82].
300
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filmmakers appear to choose controversial subjects in order to attract foreign attention, accolades, and investment, which they hope
to parlay into subsequent opportunities to make approved mass
market films in China.308 Lastly, because underground films are
unofficial, their influence on rules governing officially tolerated
speech is bound to be weaker than that of envelope-pushing approved films.309
It seems that Chinese officials are powerless to stop the trend
of audiences demanding increasingly diverse, direct, hard-hitting,
and mature subject matter and filmmakers rushing in to satisfy that
demand. SARFT officials complain privately (and publicly310) that
films released in Chinese theaters today are “trashy.”311 China’s
president Xi Jinping recently admonished creators not to allow
their art to “lose its direction as it is absorbed into the market
economy,” reminding them that the “basic requirement of the Party” is that “art must reflect well the people’s wishes; it must persist in the fundamental orientation of serving the people and serving
Socialism.”312 Yet every one of the “trashy” films that regulators
lament has undergone and passed their own review. Meanwhile,
wholesome main melody films have long languished at the box office,313 as the 2013 film Young Lei Feng vividly demonstrated. Young
Lei Feng, which told the apocryphal life story of a paragon of Revolutionary virtue, was released to much official fanfare on “Learn
From Lei Feng Day” but was reportedly pulled from theaters in
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numerous cities on the first day after it “failed to sell a single ticket.”314
Rather than calling for a return to yesteryear, many critics of
the increasingly diverse, sexual, violent, and thematically-mature
films produced in China are calling for a film rating system.315 China does not have a rating system, as many countries do, to indicate
the content’s age appropriateness.316 The lack of a rating system
derives from the Party’s position that unhealthy content is prohibited from distribution; therefore, any film appropriate for adults is
equally appropriate for children. The divergence between theory
and reality on this point has grown for the better part of three decades, and it is not coincidental that that span has witnessed the
growth of film commercialization. The premise that all approved
content is “healthy” for the masses is a principal justification for
the sweeping content censorship rules. Adopting a rating system
would be tantamount to admitting that certain segments of society
can tolerate “unhealthy” graphic or disturbing content—a fundamental paradox given film and literature’s role as a morally and politically edifying medium. Unsurprisingly, therefore, authorities
steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that formal content regulations
are profoundly out of step with the realities of content produced
and distributed now in China.317 Consumers and even distributors
may be poised to force their hand, however. In 2013, the China
Consumers Association publicly called for a ratings system, and a
survey of more than six-thousand moviegoers found that ninety
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percent support a ratings system.318 The public outcry over the inappropriateness of Breakup Buddies for children, and the lack of any
way for parents to determine the level of appropriateness beforehand, renewed the media debate over a film ratings system in
2014.319 One theater owner made international news by taking matters into his own hands and instituting and enforcing his own ratings system.320 If (and perhaps when) the Party admits the Emperor has no clothes and adopts a ratings system, it may be the most
overt demonstration yet of the market’s formidable counterweight
to the power of state censors and ideologues.
There are, of course, many films that do not pass censorship
review, including ostensibly “aboveground” films produced as part
of the official process. One notable example of the latter is Li Yu’s
Lost in Beijing, which was initially approved for distribution in 2008
and then subsequently banned and pulled from theaters after grossing over $2 million.321 The film, a drama/domestic comedy, deals
explicitly with topics such as rape, infidelity, gambling, and marital
strife.322 In a memo circulated to SARFT officials, the film was
banned because it was distributed in China and overseas with
“pornographic content” that had not passed censorship review.323
Often, there are no clear answers for why a given film is approved while a similar film is not. What does seem clear, however,
is that market demands and industry concerns now factor significantly into the equation. As political scientist Stanley Rosen and
cinema studies professor Ying Zhu observe,
In the absence of the familiar state subsidies of the
Maoist era, media and cultural units in postsocialist
318
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China are judged by their commercial success in a
crowded marketplace. State authorities and regulators fully understand this, even when the primary
(political) values of the authorities are incongruent
with the (commercial) values of the units they supervise. This has led to a system marked by negotiation, sometimes tacit and sometimes public, where
cultural units may include their audiences as a
means of pressuring the authorities to exercise restraint in their control and regulation.324
Thus, the film censorship process involves a three-way dialog
between the censors, the audience, and filmmakers. Censors wield
great power over filmmakers but relatively little direct power over
the audience, which has the option of simply avoiding the cinema if
the offerings are not compelling, as happened in the 1990s.325
Filmmakers need to produce attractive and compelling content.
Even in these box office boom times, filmgoers are dissatisfied with
the quality of Chinese films, noting as major reasons domestic
films’ similarity, thematic repetition, and lack of creativity—all
problems that largely stem from or are exacerbated by censorship.326 If consumer dissatisfaction manifests itself in sagging box
office returns for domestic films, the pressure on SARFT to loosen
the censorship reigns further will mount.
Why would the Party feel the need to yield to market pressures
and temper their information control practices, at least to some extent, to ensure the continued health and growth of the domestic
film industry? There are at least five reasons. First, as discussed
above in Part II, state-supported filmmaking is unsustainable and
goes against the grain of economic reform and privatization that
has revolutionized much of China’s economy. Second, film is an
important form of entertainment and social release in China, especially for young people,327 and officials at the highest level recog324
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nize film’s social value as a form of entertainment.328 Ensuring the
health and growth of a film industry that puts out quality product
to satisfy demand fits within the Party’s strategy of non-democratic
appeasement that some have called “responsive authoritarianism.”329 Third, officials also recognize the film industry’s potential
as a high-growth, low carbon-impact “green business,” and are incentivized to foster its growth.330 Fourth, there is an everincreasingly blurred line between state and private interests in China. China Film Group (“CFG”), for example, is a massive stateowned enterprise, the largest player in the Chinese film industry,
and the paramount member of the state-run film import duopoly.331
As an investor in all aspects of the industry from film technologies
to production, importation, and distribution, CFG is extremely invested in the success of China’s film industry, as are many other
state-owned or invested companies.332 Fifth, officials have repeatedly voiced a desire to improve China’s global “soft power,” that
is, its ability to attain desired outcomes through attraction and persuasion rather than force.333 The United States’ attractive power
through its culture industries, Hollywood in particular, is the para-
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digmatic example, and one that China has studied well.334 In
theory, the more advanced, globally competitive, and attractive
Chinese films are, the more global audiences will be attracted to
Chinese culture. In government documents, soft power is expressly
cited as an important reason to foster a flourishing film industry.335
Until now, foreign consumers have shown little interest in Chinese
films, and many theorize that the creative shackling that results
from censorship is a major reason why.336 Giving Chinese films the
creative space needed to be globally competitive is another pressure point to which Chinese censors are no doubt increasingly sensitive. Lastly, some observers argue the government’s obvious willingness to turn a blind eye to content regulation violations reflects
the influence of cultural liberals within the Party.337 The Party liberals believe that a permissive approach will improve China’s global image and provide a steam valve for a new generation of creative
talent.338 In exchange for having more creative freedom, filmmakers will accept the unwritten ground rules: no direct criticism of the
party and no overt calls for mobilization.339
3. SARFT Censorship Practice as an Adaptive Informal
Institution that Could Lead to Liberalization of Formal
Content Regulations
The previous subsection demonstrates that censors routinely
act in ways that permit widespread technical violations of content
regulations. Still, the rules are not invoked or ignored consistently,
and the ad hoc and opaque nature of the practice is eminently fru334

See generally Stanley Rosen, The Chinese Dream Confronts the American Dream in
Popular Culture: China as Producer and Consumer of Films at Home and Abroad (May 1,
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
335
See, e.g., Guidance on Promoting the Prosperity and Development of the Film
Industry, supra note 328.
336
See The Red Carpet, supra note 229.
337
See, e.g., PICKOWICZ, supra note 122, at 330. Pickowicz discusses this phenomenon in
the context of the state’s relatively permissive attitude toward underground films in the
early 2000s, but his analysis applies equally well to the state’s approach to
“aboveground” commercial productions. Furthermore, as Pickowicz notes, there is often
a blurry line between aboveground and underground filmmakers and their projects. Id. at
325–35.
338
Id. at 331–32.
339
Id. at 332.

2015]

COPYRIGHT AND FREE EXPRESSION

61

strating to film producers trying to differentiate their product by
pushing the limits of acceptable content. That said, the ad hoc nature of censorship practice might in fact engender formal liberalization down the road.
Attempts to create a more open, transparent media while simultaneously attempting to maintain effective ideological control
over that media creates an apparently irreconcilable dilemma for
Chinese policy makers. The Party may, as Rogier Creemers puts it,
simply be “trapped.”340 In that case, there are two potential outcomes. First, censors could take a hardline turn, strengthening the
formal content rules and enforcing them emphatically. This outcome seems unlikely, as it would certainly lead to a significant
downturn in the Chinese film industry that would, for reasons discussed above, be unacceptable to Chinese authorities. Second, and
more plausibly, censorship officials could take a more organic,
permissive, and experimental approach to censorship practice,
while leaving the more restrictive formal laws intact as a baseline
standard until circumstances warrant a change in formal laws. In
fact, this circumstance echoes previous high-stakes clashes between ideology and practical, market-driven considerations in
which the latter ultimately gained an upper hand over ideology and
Party control—namely, China’s large scale economic reforms in
the 1980s and 1990s.
Political science professor Kellee Tsai observes that most institutions do not exist in isolation.341 Rather, they often exist in mutually dependent clusters.342 Changes in formal institutions often
result not from top-down decisions but from coping strategies that
arise on the ground in reaction to limitations and restrictions in
formal institutions that develop into widely practiced regularized
patterns of interactions that violate the formal institutions.343
These regularized, violative practices become informal institutions
in their own right.344 These widespread informal practices, which
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Tsai calls “adaptive informal institutions,” contribute to the “institutional conversion of a formal regulation.”345
To demonstrate this principle, Tsai argues that China’s sweeping economic reforms did not originate with top-down economic
policymaking.346 In fact, “China’s formal institutions have presented local state and economic actors with more of a constraining
rather than a permissive environment for private capital accumulation.”347 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when large numbers of
private entrepreneurs sprang up in China, private businesses were
illegal and there was much disagreement and uncertainty among
Party leaders about the direction of economic reform and the desirability of private enterprise.348 Nevertheless, many individuals,
faced with a dearth of income-generating opportunities after the
dismantling of the “iron rice bowl” of socialism, began engaging in
entrepreneurial activity.349 Local cadres, who oversaw locales that
faced their own economic difficulties, had little incentive to enforce
the formal rules and every incentive to bend them to accommodate
these money-generating entrepreneurs. Not surprisingly, many local cadres joined the emerging entrepreneurial class. After some
time, the entrepreneurialism operating in a legal gray zone was sufficiently widespread and effective to convince central government
officials that a shift toward a market-oriented economy would
work. It was only then that changes to the formal laws occurred. In
Tsai’s example, the formal institutions trailed and were influenced
by informal adaptations that responded to practical realities on the
ground.350
The more actual practice diverges from the formal rules, and
the more entrenched the practice becomes, the more likely it is that
the formal rules will eventually change to reflect the practice. Such
change can already be observed in China’s copyright industries.
Professor Hongsong Song demonstrates that as China’s book industry transitioned from state-subsidized production to market345
346
347
348
349
350
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based production and remuneration in the 1990s, state firms lagged
far behind the practices of the illicit private publishers, who paid
their authors copyright royalties instead of the basic remuneration
rates still practiced by state publishers.351 Successful authors were
highly incentivized to work with private publishers (which were
fronted by state publishing operations)352 as the authors could make
far more money publishing with private publishers than with state
publishers.353 The resulting formal reforms, spurred by economically driven informal coping strategies, follow the same evolutionary path from coping strategy to adaptive informal institution to
formal reform that Professor Tsai describes:
In the process of commercialization, market forces
gradually changed the behavior of the participants in
the publishing sector and established a new set of
conventions largely based on the profit motive. The
official acceptance of copyright royalties shows how
the new behavioral principles achieved a dominant
role in practice and forced the state to change formal rules to match reality . . . .
The emergence and growth of copyright royalties in the 1990s was a significant event for both the
relaxation of press control and the development of
copyright. The increasing importance of marketdriven copyright royalties meant not only that copyright holders were able to enjoy market profits, but
also that there was a significant decline in state patronage and a corresponding rise in authors’ independence.354
This model suggests it is possible for informal practices, such
as allowance of films that formally violate censorship rules, to induce bottom-up changes to the formal regulations. While there has
not yet been formal liberalization of content regulations, in the
long-term, the prospects for such a change are promising given the
gradually (albeit spasmodically) increasing divide between formal
351
352
353
354
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censorship rules and practice. The decentralization of SARFT censorship review, noted above, could also help spur this change, just
as in the economic reform context, where local responses to practical realities of entrepreneurs were conducive to driving bottomup policy changes that would have been impossible in a system of
highly centralized control.355
4. The Social and Expressive Value of Film
Commercialization Undergirded by Copyright
Among the examples of films discussed above that violate
SARFT content rules, none takes on the most politically sensitive
subject matter in today’s China. None overtly challenges Party rule
or calls for a democratic system of government, for example, which
would doubtless trigger an instant ban. Nevertheless, the films
above offer fresh viewpoints on topics of importance to contemporary Chinese society in a package with broad appeal.356 Breakup
Buddies, for example, while on the surface a bawdy comedy, explores relationships, divorce, and sexuality in an aging Chinese society, and, in the director’s vision, is an allegory for Chinese society itself as it reaches a crossroads in its political and economic maturation. As Ning recently told the Hollywood Reporter,
For the last 30 years, China has experienced fast development. After the fast development, it is slowing
down. It is like a transition from a young person to
middle age. He faces some problems and he must
think of what was not good before and where to go
in the future. My feeling is that China is experiencing middle age and adjusting itself after fast development.
Because of the fast development, people’s values are a bit thin and the only one value is success. It
will create some problems for sure if you measure
everything by this yardstick, including love. So a
355
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one-night stand appears to be a way of releasing
pressure and dissatisfaction with love. It becomes a
normal phenomenon. I want to use this angle to tell
a modern story.357
Ning’s No Man’s Land, beneath its violence, action, and dark
humor, comments on “disintegrating morality and unchecked,
rampant selfishness” and “shines a glaring light on how little life is
valued in modern mercenary China,” even though all along “Ning
is having a gleefully nasty time with it.”358 Even the slapstick romp
and megahit Lost in Thailand derives much humor and much of its
vast success from lampooning materialism and exposing the anxieties of China’s urban middle class.359
One should not discount the social importance of such messages. As Professor Paul Pickowicz argues, numerous creators who
chose to work in the “velvet prison” of the official but moderately
permissive aboveground film sector in China have, through their
critical examinations of Chinese society and politics, “chipped
away at the foundation of state socialism” and “eroded public confidence in the system.”360 Chinese literature has a great tradition of
critical or oppositional messages embedded in entertaining and
seemingly apolitical works. Moreover, it is easy—especially for
Western critics—to primarily evaluate phenomena within China
through the limited and polarized lens of democratization. Professor Bingchun Meng argues that researchers of China’s Internet appear to have an “ongoing fixation, in both the mainstream media
and the academic circle, on whether the Internet could democratize China.”361 She notes a number of problems with that limited
approach, including that it imposes a Western-centric view of
progress, is likely to result in missing important nuances in changing power relationships in society, and may cause one to overlook
357
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the experience and effect on average consumers.362 This is not to
discount the importance of democratic values for China and
beyond; rather, it is to emphasize that films—even officially approved commercial films—can and do speak to many other topics—even sensitive topics—of importance to ordinary Chinese citizens. Most importantly, the general long-term trend, partly if not
largely coerced by market trends, appears to be toward permitting
more, not fewer, such topics to be addressed in film. Thus, even
partial media liberalization has important social benefits, powerful
critical potential, and the potential to engender further media liberalization.
There is an inherent danger in partial media liberalization,
however. As Daniela Stockmann has demonstrated, partial liberalization of the news and print media in China, driven by commercial
imperatives similar to those encountered by the film industry, has
probably led to more effective state information control over sensitive topics, despite the explosion of commercial magazines and
news publications eager to feed a vast market hungry for new news
and perspectives.363 What explains this paradox? The answer, according to Professor Stockmann, lies in consumer perceptions of
free speech based on the perceived nature of the speaker.364 For
news concerning politically sensitive topics, consumers are more
likely to be skeptical of traditional “political organ papers” such as
the People’s Daily or China Daily, which they believe to parrot the
Party line.365 On the other hand, consumers are more likely to trust
messages in commercialized papers and magazines, which “brand
themselves as trustworthy representatives of ordinary citizens,
leading to greater credibility in the eyes of audiences.”366 Commercialized media is responsive to market demand and thus “feels
free” to consumers, especially when reporting on less sensitive
topics. But the more sensitive the topic, the more censorship mechanisms that control all licit news media, even commercialized
media, kick in to ensure that the tone and position taken in com362
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mercial media does not diverge too sharply from the Party line.
Thus what feels like free reporting to consumers is often the Party
line. In this way, partial press freedom actually increases the persuasiveness of the Party’s messaging.367
This is an obvious danger in the film space, as well. Main melody films are currently viewed as ham-handed propaganda that is of
little interest to most consumers. The government will doubtless
improve its ability to weave its message into entertaining, attractive
films both through the production of better features and through
required revisions that both add and delete content.
While the market enables this form of more persuasive messaging, the market also provides a strong counterbalance. The audience’s relationship to film, which is primarily a form of entertainment, differs from its relationship to news media. If the audience feels that domestic film content becomes too narrow or predictable, which is already a common complaint,368 history indicates
that attendance will suffer—an outcome that, for reasons described
above,369 is unacceptable to authorities. Market pressures are the
best way to ensure new voices and viewpoints emerge that stimulate audiences. The alternative model—a dual production system
with official state-supported main melody films on one extreme and
unapproved underground films on the other, holds little promise
for producing a vibrant, diverse film culture in China. After all, underground films require funding, as well. But, as Geremie Barmé
observes, since they cannot be lawfully distributed and monetized
in China, underground films have a history of being crafted to
please a different master—Western audiences and critics.370 For
this reason, director Chen Daming believes even underground
films “are not a true reflection of China.”371 Chen believes that
filmmakers should participate in aboveground filmmaking, despite
the burdens of censorship.372 What the industry needs, he argues, is
367
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high quality domestic cinema,373 not the shunting of China’s most
talented directors and writers into lower-production-value, marginalized underground cinema, or into other industries altogether.
Even in the case of news media in China, Stockmann observes a
phenomenon akin to that which this Article argues is occurring in
the film space: “marketized media bring about political change,”
even if not democratic reform.374 “The introduction of market mechanisms leads media to undergo cycles of liberalization and retrenchment,” Stockmann observes, “whereby the state walks a
fine line between tolerating space to respond to market demands
and controlling media content.”375 Noting that censorship authorities are sensitive—to a point—to market demands, Stockmann
concludes that “[i]n the long term, these dynamics appear to lead
to greater openness of space in news reporting and cautious adjustments of central policy positions to popular demands.”376
While to date, according to Stockmann, this has failed to yield
greater pluralism of political viewpoints on sensitive subjects in
news media,377 it provides evidence that the market-censorproducer relationship is dynamic and each group exercises a measure of power to counterbalance and influence the others. Furthermore, this exercise of power can, through inducing widespread informal coping mechanisms, lead to liberalization of formal rules to
the benefit of all consumers of information in China.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s main claim is simple and relatively narrow: film
industry commercialization in China, enabled and undergirded by
copyright law, is not a drag on free speech. To the contrary, it engenders liberalization of the government’s informal censorship
practices and even its formal censorship rules. This has led to
greater diversity of film subject matter available for mass consumption than any other model.
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I do not argue that copyright and commercialization is a panacea that will fully defang or obliterate censorship policies or trigger
higher-level political reforms. Censorship remains the bane of China’s film industry and, as China’s film industry grows in global importance, the global film industry. Free speech in China’s film industry has a tremendously long way to go. Censorship in China is
deeply rooted in traditional views of literature as morally edifying,
and today film censorship is, in the Party’s view, closely tied to
state legitimacy and stability. Nevertheless, contemporary censorship practice in China’s film industry results from a dialog between
the market, the censors, and filmmakers. Market demands and
filmmakers’ need and desire to satisfy those demands (in addition
to their own creative impulses) have provided a counterbalance to
state censorship that can, does, and likely will continue to erode
censorship practices as well as formal content-oriented rules. The
alternative model—state patronage that produces “main melody”
propaganda films while private filmmakers produce underground
films that are unable to reach a mass Chinese audience and therefore might not even be produced with a Chinese audience in
mind—would have far more negative consequences for expressive
diversity in Chinese cinema.

